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Using Certificates with TIA Portal

SIMATIC / TIA Portal

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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This document addresses the key aspects of certificate management in OT environments, a topic gaining special significance as industries shift to the digital era. In this new industrial landscape, OT systems face the same challenges and risks as the IT domain, underscoring the need to secure communications and ensure proper understanding and utilization of certificates.

Therefore, this application example provides guidelines to establish secure communications in the context of OPC UA, OUC (Open User Communication) and HTTPS, offering an overview of the tools and possibilities available within TIA Portal.

1.2 Public Key Infrastructure

Integrity, confidentiality, and endpoint authentication

The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) stands as a robust framework in the field of cybersecurity, safeguarding digital communications by ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of messages transmitted over networks, as well as providing endpoint authentication.

- Integrity: Data must remain unchanged and unaltered during transmission.
- Confidentiality: Sensitive information must be kept private and inaccessible to unauthorized parties.
- Authentication: The communication partner is who it claims to be and the party who is to be reached.

Basic principles

To grasp how the Public Key Infrastructure manages to secure communications, it is necessary to understand signing and encryption.

• Encryption is the process of transforming plain text into ciphertext, making it solely understandable to authorized users. By employing an "encryption key", a unique cipher is generated, effectively locking the message. Only entities possessing the correct key can decrypt and unlock this data, guaranteeing its confidentiality.

There are two main types of encryptions: symmetric and asymmetric encryption.

- 1. Symmetric encryption employs a single key for both encryption and decryption of the cipher, rendering it an efficient, simple, and high-performance procedure. The main challenge of this approach lies in securely distributing the shared key between the sender and the receiver, without it being intercepted by unauthorized parties.
- 2. On the other hand, asymmetric encryption involves a pair of keys: a private key and a public key. Data encrypted with one key can only be decrypted with the other. While the public key is shared openly, the private key must always remain secret.

Each communication partner has its own private and public keys, solving the key distribution problem present in symmetric cryptography. Nonetheless, it is computationally intensive and therefore not suitable for large data transfers.

To tackle the disadvantages associated with each individual encryption method, the PKI adopts a hybrid approach. Initially, communication partners employ asymmetric encryption to establish a secure channel, facilitating the exchange of a symmetric key between them. Once the shared key has been exchanged, communication transitions to symmetric encryption that can handle extensive sets of data.

• Digital signing is used to verify authenticity and integrity. The sender passes the message through a hashing algorithm, generating a unique code known as "hash". This code is encrypted with the sender's private key, forming a digital signature. Both the signature and the original message are transmitted.

Upon receiving the message, the recipient uses the sender's public key to decrypt the signature and extract the original hash. Then, the receiver performs the hashing process with the received message and compares it with the original. If both hashes match, the integrity and authenticity of the message can be confirmed.

Course of the secure communication

The figure below shows, in simplified terms, how communication is established ("handshake") focusing on the negotiation of keys used for data exchange. This process can be generalized to all communication options that are based on the usage of TLS, i.e., Secure Open User Communication.



Key components of the PKI

The Public Key Infrastructure main components are:

- Public and private keys, to perform the initial asymmetric encryption.
- Digital certificates, which serve as electronic credentials that bind public keys to the identity
 of the certificate holder.
- Certificate Authorities (CAs), used to validate the identity of certificate holders and issue new certificates.
- Servers, often referred to as subjects, are network entities that need to prove their identity.
- Clients, or relying parties, must trust servers to establish a secure connection with them.

NOTE In certain protocols, such as HTTPS, clients only validate the server's identity. In contrast, some industrial protocols such as OPC UA require mutual authentication, establishing a two-way trust relationship between clients and servers.

NOTE Clients and servers can be configured to allow connections from any communication partner without requiring authentication. It is essential, however, to restrict this configuration to the testing or commissioning stages. Transitioning to a production environment mandates special emphasis on security. Thus, access must be limited to authorized entities and communication safeguarded through signing and encryption.

1.3 Digital certificates

Certificate basics

A certificate is a digital/electronic credential used to assert the online identities of individuals, computers, and other entities on a network. They are similar to ID cards, and they bind the identity of the owner with a public key.

X-509 is one of the most common standards used to define the format of certificates. To ensure the authenticity of the entities and enable signing and encryption, these certificates include the following fields:

- Public key.
- Serial number of the certificate.
- Version number of the certificate.
- Validity period (starting and expiring dates).
- Owner (certificate subject).
- Issuer (CA or self-signed).
- Supported encryption and signing algorithms.
- Extensions Subject Alternative Name (since X-509 Version 3)

NOTE Certificates do not contain the private key of the subject, as it must be kept secret.

Certificate types

Different types of certificates can be found depending on the entity of the issuer, as they can be generated by their own (self-signed) or issued by a Certificate Authority (CA).

- Self-signed certificates: Each device creates its own certificate; therefore, they are both certificate holder and issuer. To establish trust relations between devices, it is necessary to import all partner certificates.
- Certificates issued by a Certificate Authority (CA): Device certificates are signed by a Certificate Authority. Therefore, if the CA is trusted, all communication devices whose certificates are issued by this CA are instantly trusted and thus authorized to establish a connection.

To invalidate certificates that are no longer deemed valid or trusted, Certificate Authorities employ Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL).

Decision making for different scenarios

• Self-signed approach: It can be useful in small and static systems where the number of devices is low. However, given that devices have a maximum limit of keys that can be stored (64 in the case of SIMATIC PLCs), this approach can lead to resource bottlenecks.

Additionally, introducing new devices to the system can be challenging, as new certificates must be distributed to all communication partners. Therefore, industrial systems with these certificates can be difficult to maintain (renew certificates) and expand.

• **Issued by Certificate Authorities:** This second approach offers more flexibility when managing medium to big systems, and it consumes less storage resources, as only CA certificates need to be loaded to the CPUs.

The primary drawback of this approach is the need for a centralized administrative instance equipped with security measures for private keys. However, this concern can be effectively addressed using TIA's Certificate Manager.

1.4 Certificate Management

Key Handling

Proper handling of certificates is critical to maintain integrity, confidentiality, and availability within industrial systems. As highlighted earlier, in the Public Key Infrastructure, entities make use of both a public and a private key to establish secure communications. Therefore, understanding the distinctions between these keys and how they must be handled is of utmost importance.

Public Key: The public key is intentionally created for widespread use, and it can be shared freely to any entity without compromising the security of the system. Its responsibilities include:

- Encryption of messages: to ensure that only the owner of the matching private key can decrypt and access the information.
- Verification of digital signatures: providing assurance that a message is indeed originated from the rightful owner of the private key.

Private Key: On the other hand, the private key is strictly confidential and must be kept secret. Its roles include:

- Decryption of messages: that are sent and encrypted by communication partners, using the corresponding public key.
- Signing: so other devices can verify the authenticity and integrity of messages.

Consequently, protection of private keys is imperative to prevent unauthorized access, decryption, and forging of digital signatures. Sections 2.4.6 and 2.5.5 include diagrams to showcase how certificates and private keys must be handled in different scenarios.

Certificate renewal

In Operational Technology (OT), the recommended certificate validity is regulated by the specific needs and security practices of the organization. There are, however, some general guidelines.

- 1. **Shorter validity periods:** Due to the criticality of industrial systems and the ever-evolving security threats, certificates in OT environments often have shorter validity periods compared to traditional IT systems. This typical validity might range from a few months to a few years.
- Regular renewal: Renewing certificates regularly helps to maintain a higher level of security by ensuring that older certificates, which might become compromised or less secure over time due to newly emerging technologies, are replaced with newer ones.
- 3. **Balance security and operational impact:** While shorter validity periods enhance security, frequent certificate changes could potentially impact operational continuity. Therefore, it is essential to find a balance between security needs and operational impact.

Refer to chapter 3.1, "GDS Push for dynamic certificate management", to gain insights on how to handle certificates with minimal disruptions to production.

4. **Compliance to industry standards:** Some industries or regulatory frameworks might require specific conditions regarding certificate validity periods.

Thus, OT environments tend to follow a more conservative approach than some IT environments when it comes to certificate validity. This stems from the critical nature of industrial control systems and the need to mitigate risks associated with cyber threats while considering the continuous operation of these systems.

1.5 Components used

This application example consists of the following components:

Component	Article number	Note
TIA Portal V19	6ES7822-1AA23-0YA5	-
CPU 1516F-3 PN/PD	6ES7516-3FP03-0AB0	FW 3.1 – With previous firmware versions, step-by-step procedures can differ from those outlined in this document.
CPU 1516-3 PN/PD	6ES7516-3AP03-0AB0	FW 3.1

2 Engineering

2.1 Hardware setup

A PG with TIA Portal V19 is used to create and manage certificates, as well as configuring the S7-1500 CPU. The CPU will run an OPC UA server, a Web server, and a TLS server for Secure OUC. To test these protocols, UaExpert operates as the OPC UA client, Edge functions as the web browser for connecting to the web server, and a second PLC runs the TLS client.



2.2 Planning

This application example is structured into distinct sections, each focusing on a specific topic. It starts with an assessment on how to manage certificates within TIA Portal, offering a comprehensive overview of the possibilities that TIA Portal currently offers. Following this point, the document provides guidelines and examples on how to handle certificates for each communication protocol. Finally, a brief introduction to dynamic management of certificates via GDS Push is carried out.

2.3 TIA Portal for certificate management

2.3.1 Overview

Certificate management options in TIA Portal

Since TIA Portal version V14 and CPU firmware version V2.0, certificate management for S7-1500 CPUs has been available. The table below outlines all certificate management options based on the service used, TIA Portal version, and firmware version of S7-1500 PLCs.

Service	Certificate management with TIA Portal (TIA Portal version / S7-1500 CPU FW-version)	Certificate management with OPC UA GDS push methods (TIA Portal version / S7-1500 CPU FW-version)
Web server	as of V14 / as of V2.0	as of V18 / as of V3.0
Secure OUC	as of V14 / as of V2.0	-
OPC UA server	as of V14 / as of V2.0	as of V17 / as of V2.9
OPC UA client	as of V15.1 / as of V2.6	-
Secure PG/HMI communication	as of V17 / as of V2.9	-
Syslog client	as of V19 / as of V3.1	-

Additionally, as of firmware version V4.4, S7-1200 CPUs also support secure communication.

Local and global certificate managers

TIA Portal offers different options to manage certificates via the local and global certificate managers.

- Local certificate manager: Each device has its own local certificate manager, where certificates are generated and managed for each individual device. These certificates can be used for the OPC UA server and Web server running on the device, as well as for additional system features that require certificates, such as Secure OUC.
- Global certificate manager: Contains an overview of all the certificates used in a project, including Certification Authorities, certificates issued by CAs, and self-signed certificates.
- **NOTE** Certificates must always be included in the local certificate manager of a device to be part of the HW configuration. Referencing the certificate's ID in the global certificate manager is not sufficient to assign the certificate to a device.

Global security settings

Devices in TIA Portal can be configured to operate exclusively with the local certificate manager or utilize both the local and global certificate managers through the global security settings.

If the global security settings are disabled in a device, it will only have access to the CPUspecific certificate manager. Consequently, its functionality will be limited, as it won't have access to root CAs or other certificates imported into the project.

Activating the global security settings allows the local certificate manager to access the global certificate manager and vice versa. Thus, the device is granted access to the certificate store of the project and to additional functionalities covered in section 2.3.3.

NOTE

To access the global certificate manager, the project must be protected, and the user must be logged in as administrator.

2.3.2 Using the local certificate manager

Access to the local certificate manager

The local certificate manager is located within each device.

1. To access the local CPU-specific certificate manager, select the CPU in the project tree and navigate to the "Properties" tab.



 Select "Protection & Security > Certificate Manager > Certificate Management with TIA Portal". If a device supports "secure PG/PC and HMI communication", a certificate is automatically generated to enable this type of communication.

General IO tags	System constant	ts 1	Texts					
Entry page	^ , Ce	rtificate	managem	ent with TIA Por	tal			
Overview of interfaces	7							
Display	Glo	bal seci	urity setti	ngs				
Multilingual support								
Time of day		The global security settings for the certificate manager are not enabled. Only limited functionality is available.						
 Protection & Security 								
Protection of the PLC confi	···· – –				Use global security se	ettings for certificate manager		
Access control	_							
 Connection mechanisms 								
Connection mechanism	ns 7 Dev	Device certificates						
 Certificate manager 								
Certificate manager		ID	Common	name of subject	Service	Issuer	Valid until	
Certificate manageme.		💡 1	PLC-1/Co	mmunication-1	Communication	O=Siemens, C=DE, CN=	=P 1/10/2037	
► Syslog			<add nev<="" td=""><td>V></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></add>	V>				

Note: Due to the limited functionality in the local certificate manager, certificates can only be created, exported (without the private key) or deleted.

Device	cert	tificates			
	ID	Common name of subject	Service	Issuer	Valid until
?	1	PLC-1/Communication-1	Communication	O=Siemens, C=DE, CN=P	1/10/2037
		<add new=""></add>		Export certificate	
				🗙 Delete certificate	

Creating new certificates

New certificates can be created in various ways within the local certificate manager.

 To add new certificates, click on "<Add new>" and "Create". Enter all certificate parameters in the corresponding input fields. As highlighted in the snapshot, certificates can only be self-signed, as the local certificate manager has no access to Certification Authorities.

Device certificates

	ommunication-1	ct Service Comr 1		ssuer D=Siemens, C=DE, C	Valid until N=P 1/10/2037		
<add ne<="" th=""><th>W></th><th>⊐ < ё</th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></add>	W>	⊐ < ё					
					Common name of sul	aart Irruar	Valid until
			1		PLC-1/Communicatio	n-1 O=Siemens, C=DI	E, CN=P 1/10/2037
			<		1111	2	
						$\langle \bullet \rangle$	💕 Create
te certificate					>	\sim	
Purpose				3			
	Usage: 🔽)pcUa Server		P	T		
	Keyusage: N	Ion Repudiation, Di lata Encipherment,	gital Signature, I , Certificate Sign	<ey encipherment,<="" td=""><td><u>∧</u></td><td></td><td></td></ey>	<u>∧</u>		
Certificate authorit	ty (CA)	d.					
alact how the new co		igneu.					
Select how the new ce	eruncate win be si						
Select how the new ce Selfsigned	ion authority						
Select how the new ce Selfsigned Signed by certificati	ion authority						
Selfsigned Signed Signed Signed by certificat	ion authority				Select		
Selfsigned Selfsigned Selfsigned Selfsigned by certificat	CA name:				Select		
Signed by certificat	CA name: ter for the new certif	icate :		4	Select		
Signed by certificat	CA name: CA name: tter for the new certif	icate: LC-1/OPCUA-1-2		4	Select		
Signed by certificat	CA name: CA name: for the new certifine of subject: Retirement of su	icate: LC-1/OPCUA-1-2 SA		4	Select		
Signed by certificat	CA name: CA	icate: LC-1/0PCUA-1-2 SA 1048		4	Select		
Signed by certificat	CA name: CA	icate: LC-1/OPCUA-1-2 SA 048 ha256		4	Select		
Signed by certificat	CA name: CA	icate: LC-I/OPCUA-1-2 SA 1048 ha256 anuary 10 , 2024	04:02:44 P	4 M	Select		
Signed by certificat	CA name: CA	icate: LC-1/OPCUA-1-2 SA 	04:02:44 P 04:00:00 P	4 M M	Select		
Subject Alternative	CA name: CA	icate: LC-1/OPCUA-1-2 SA 1048 ha256 anuary 10 , 2024 anuary 10 , 2037 Type	04 : 02 : 44 P 04 : 00 : 00 P Value	4 м	Select		
Subject Alternative	CA name: CA	icate: LC-1/OPCUA-1-2 SA 	04 : 02 : 44 P 04 : 00 : 00 P Value um: IMATIC: 1 102 168 C 1	4 М М 17-1500.0РС-UA-Applii	Select		
Signed by certificat	CA name: CA	icate: LC-1/OPCUA-1-2 SA 	04 : 02 : 44 P 04 : 00 : 00 P Value um:SIMATICS 192.168.0.1 192.168.1	4 М 17-1500.0РС-UA.Appliu	Select		
Select how the new co Self signed Signed by certificat Certificate parameters Common nan Encryp Ha: Subject Alternative	CA name: CA	icate: LC-1/OPCUA-1-2 SA 048 ha 256 anuary 10 , 2024 anuary 10 , 2037 Type URI IP IP IP IP	04 : 02 : 44 P 04 : 00 : 00 P Value um:SIMATIC.5 192.168.0.1 192.168.1.1	4 М М 17-1500.0РС-UA-Applic	Select		
Select how the new co Self signed Signed by certificat Certificate parameters Common nan Encryp Ha: Subject Alternative	CA name: CA name: CA name: ter for the new certif ne of subject: tion method: Key length: Sh algorithm: Valid from: Valid from: Valid nutil: Name (SAN):	icate: LC-1/OPCUA-1-2 SA 048 ha 256 anuary 10 , 2024 anuary 10 , 2037 Type URI IP IP	04 : 02 : 44 P 04 : 00 : 00 P Value um:SIMATIC.5 192.168.0.1 192.168.1.1	4 М М 17-1500.0РС-UA-Applic	Select		
Select how the new co Self signed Signed by certificat Certificate parameters Common nan Encryp Ha: Subject Alternative	CA name: CA name: CA name: ter for the new certif ne of subject: tion method: Key length: Sh algorithm: Valid from: Valid from: Valid nutil: Name (SAN):	icate: LC-1/OPCUA-1-2 SA 048 ha 256 anuary 10 , 2024 anuary 10 , 2037 Type URI IP CAId new> CAId new>	04 : 02 : 44 P 04 : 00 : 00 P Value um:SIMATIC.5 192.168.0.1 192.168.1.1	4 М 57-1500.0РС-UA.Appli	Select		

2. In addition, certificates are automatically added into the CPU during the activation of both the web and OPC UA servers. Full detailed instructions on how to configure these servers is provided in sections 2.4.3 and 2.5.2.



NOTE

When the global security settings are activated, the contents of the local certificate manager are deleted, and the private keys cannot be restored.

2.3.3 Using the global certificate manager

Description

To access the global certificate manager the project must be protected from unauthorized access, which is done from the project's "Security settings".

In TIA Portal version V14, these settings become visible only after activating the global security settings on at least one device. Since TIA Portal version V15, such activation is no longer required, and the project's security settings are always visible.

Access to the security settings of the project (only for TIA Portal version V14)

To access the security settings of a project in TIA Portal V14, these steps must be followed:

1. Select a CPU in the project tree and navigate to the "Properties" tab.



 Select "Protection & Security > Certificate Manager > Certificate management with TIA Portal". Activate the function "Use global security settings for certificate manager".



3. Confirm the following message with the "OK" button.



As a result, the security settings of the project become visible.

Project tree	4	Application Example Certificate Management PLC_1 [CPU 1516F-3 PN/DP]
Devices Plant objects		
11 II I	2	🔐 🛛 PLC_1 [CPU 1516F-3 PN/DP] 🔽 📖 📅 🍊 🖽 🛄 🔍 🛨
 Application Example Certificate Manag. 		
📑 Add new device		
Devices & networks		. \
PLC_1 [CPU 1516F-3 PN/DP]		PLC_1 [CPU 1516F-3 PN/DP]
Ungrouped devices		
🔻 📷 Security settings		General IO tags System constants Texts
🙀 Settings		
👬 Users and roles		Certificate management with TIA Portal
Cross-device functions		Global security settings
🕨 🙀 Common data		
Documentation settings		The global security settings for the certificate manager are enabled.
🕨 词 Languages & resources		Sufficient function rights or project protection are required to work with the certificate manager.
Version control interface		Use global security settings for certificate manager
Online access		

NOTE

Enabling the global security settings deletes the contents of the local certificate manager. Therefore, if any secure communications are being used, such as "Secure PG/PC and HMI Communication", HTTPS, Secure OUC or OPC UA, new certificates need to be created.

Access to the global certificate manager

To access the global certificate manager, the project must be protected from unauthorized access. To create a project administrator:

1. Double-click on the entry "Settings" in the project tree under "Security settings". Click the "Protect this project" button.

Project tree 🔲 🕻	Management + Security settings + Settings
Devices Plant objects	
1 III III III III III III III III III I	Project protection
 Application Example Certificate Manag 	
💕 Add new device	Your project will be protected as soon as you specify a project administrator. Then you must log on to the project. The
📅 Devices & networks	project protection chinica be removed again.
PLC_1 [CPU 1516F-3 PN/DP]	This setting cannot be undone.
Ungrouped devices	Protect this project
Security settings	
🙀 Settings	\wedge
🗰 Users and roles 🖉 🖌	Ť.
Cross-device functions	

2. Define a username and password. Confirm the password and click on "OK".

Protect project		×
Define credentials for the	project administrator	
User name:	admin	
Password:	***	
Confirm password:	***	
Comment:	Administrator account	
	^	
	OK Cancel	

The "Certificate manage	r" will appear unde	r the p	project's "Secu	rity setting	s > Securi	ity fea	tures".
 E Security settings Settings Users and roles 							
🔻 🔜 Security features	Application Example Certificate M	lanagement	Security features Cer	tificate manager			_ = = ×
🤗 Certificate manager		2	Certificate authority (CA)	Pevice certifica	tes 😥 Trusted ce	ertificates a	and root cert
🕨 🚟 Firewall	🔮 🕂						
VPN groups	Certificate authority (CA)						
NTP	ID Common name of subject	Serial nu	Issuer	Valid to	Used as	Pri Signat	. Key length
Syslog	 Siemens TIA Project - Appli. 	. 2A020E7	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App	Thursday, January 8,	Certification authorit	Yes RSA-S.	. 2048 Bit
RADIUS	2 Siemens TIA Project - Appli.	. 379D3EF	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App	Thursday, January 8,	Certification authorit	Yes RSA-S.	. 2048 Bit
 Log files (offline view) 							

NOTE

Following this step, the project can only be opened after logging in with admin credentials.

Default Certification Authorities

By default, two root certificates (Certification Authorities) are provided in each project:

- The first root certificate with ID=1 employs SHA1 as the hashing algorithm.
- The second Certification Authority with ID=2 is based on SHA-256.
- Application Example Certificate Management & Security features & Certificate manager

110											
			?	Certificate authority (CA)	🤶 Device certifica	tes 😥 Trusted ce	ertifi	cates ar	nd root cert		
*	* +										
	Certificate authority (CA)										
	ID	Common name of subject	Serial nu	Issuer	Valid to	Used as	Pri	Signat	Key length		
	1	Siemens TIA Project - Appli	2A020E7	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App	Thursday, January 8,	Certification authorit	Yes	RSA-S	2048 Bit		
	2	Siemens TIA Project - Appli	379D3EF	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App	Thursday, January 8,	Certification authorit	Yes	RSA-S	2048 Bit		

NOTE

SHA1 is deprecated and it is no longer considered secure, therefore the first CA should only be used in legacy systems that do not support SHA-256.

Certificate fields in the global certificate manager

Some of the most relevant fields shown in the global certificate manager are:

Field	Description
ID	Every certificate in the certificate manager receives a unique ID that cannot be changed. The certificate ID is assigned by the certificate manager when a certificate is created or imported.
Common name of subject	Device or certificate authority for which the certificate is valid.
Serial number	Unique serial number of the certificate.
Issuer	Shows the name, organization, and country of the certificate issuer.
Valid to	Indicates when the certificate expires.
Used as	Indicates for which application or service the certificate is used, e.g., as SSL certificate or certificate authority.
Private key	Indicates whether the private key exists in the project.
Signature algorithm	Indicates the cipher of the private key as well as the hash algorithm used.
Key length	Shows the key length of the certificate.

Functions of the global certificate manager

The global certificate manager contains an overview of all the certificates used in the project, and, in contrast to the local certificate manager, incorporates a wide variety of options to manage certificates, such as:

- 1. Import new certificates and certificate authorities.
- 2. Export certificates and certificate authorities used in the project.
- 3. Renewal of expired certificates and certificate authorities.
- 4. Replacement of existing certificates.
- 5. Adding trusted certificates and certification authorities.
- 6. Deleting manually imported certificates.

Exporting certificates

Certificates and private keys can be exported in various formats. Depending on the format, the following options are available during export.

Available for	Format		Note				
during export	.cer	.der	.crt	.pem	.crl	.p12	
Private key	x	x	x	x	-	x	For *.cer and *.der, an additional key file is exported for the certificate. The exported key file cannot be imported again. For *.crt and *.pem, the private key is stored together with the certificate in a file.
Encrypted private key	-	-	x	x	-	-	Selection of the encryption method and input of password possible. If no password is entered, the project name is used as the password.
Certificate chain	-	-	×	x	-	-	Only possible if the certificates of the certificate chain are stored in the certificate manager.
Password only	-	-	-	-	-	x	If no password is entered, the project name is used as password.
Revocation list	-	-	-	-	x	-	Certain programs, such as UaExpert, require revocation lists to establish trust relationships with root CAs. TIA Portal can only export empty revocation lists.

Creating and renewing certificates

Establishing new secure communication channels involves the creation of digital certificates. Once created, long-term maintenance is achieved through the renewal of these certificates, allowing users to update the validity period of expired certificates or adjust the encryption and hashing algorithms if they become deprecated.

The creation and renewal of certificates is done through the pop-up window depicted below. To configure new certificates, the following steps must be carried out.

- Specify the intended purpose of the certificate by choosing a predefined template. Depending on the intended use, specific "KeyUsage" and "ExtendedKeyUsage" extensions will be incorporated into the certificate.
- 2. Select the issuer of the new certificate: self-signed or signed by a Certificate Authority.
- If the certificate is issued by a Certificate Authority, select it with the "Select" button. Only
 certification authorities from the certificate store of the current project, equipped with a
 private key, can be selected.
- 4. Depending on the certificate, enter the following parameters in the corresponding input fields:
 - Common name of subject: name associated with the certificate holder.
 - Encryption method: cipher algorithm used to perform asymmetric encryption.
 - Key length: Depends on the cipher. For RSA, it represents the key length in bits, while for EC, it corresponds to the ECC curve (e.g., prime256v1, secp256r1, secp384r1).
 - Hash algorithm: algorithm used for signing the certificate.
 - Valid from/until: validity period of the certificate.
 - Subject alternative name (SAN): additional host names, IP addresses, email addresses, and other identifiers associated with the certificate subject beyond the common name.

urpose			
Usage:	OpcUa Server	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	-
Keyusager	Non Repudiation, Digital Si	nnature. Key Encipherment.	~
key usuge.	Data Encipherment		- -
Certificate authority (CA)			
Select how the new certificate will be	e signed:		
Selfcioned			
Signed by certification authority			
Signed by certification autionty			
CA name:	(ID = 2) Siemens TIA Project	t - Application Example Certificate	Mi Sele
inter the parameters for the new ce	rtificate:		
			-
Common name of subject:	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4		
Common name of subject: Encryption method:	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4 RSA		•
Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length:	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4 RSA 2048	-	v
Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm:	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4 RSA 2048 sha256	 	•
Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from:	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4 RSA 2048 sha256 January 15, 2024 10 : 4	14 : 47 AM	v v
Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until:	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4 RSA 2048 sha256 January 15 , 2024 10 : 4 January 14 , 2037 04 : 0	14 : 47 AM 10 : 00 PM	T T
Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4 RSA 2048 sha256 January 15 , 2024 10 : 4 January 14 , 2037 04 : C Type Valu	14 : 47 AM 10 : 00 PM	v v
Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4 RSA 2048 sha256 January 15 , 2024 10 : 4 January 14 , 2037 04 : C Type Valu URI unn	 	T T
Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4 RSA 2048 sha256 January 15 , 2024 10 : 4 January 14 , 2037 04 : C Type Valu URI urn: IP 192 IP 192	i4 : 47 AM i i0 : 00 PM i sliMTIC.S7-1500.OPC-UA.Applica 168.0.1 168.1	v v v v
Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4 RSA 2048 sha256 January 15 , 2024 10 : 4 January 14 , 2037 04 : C Type Valu URI um: IP 192 IP 192 cAdd new>	i4 : 47 AM i i0 : 00 PM i e SIMATIC.S7-1500.OPC-UA.Applica .168.0.1 .168.1.1	V V V
Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4 RSA 2048 sha256 January 15 , 2024 10 : 4 January 14 , 2037 04 : C Type Valu URI um: IP 192 IP 192 Add new>	i4 : 47 AM i i0 : 00 PM i e SIMATIC.S7-1500.OPC-UA.Applica .168.0.1 .168.1.1	V V V
Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-4 RSA 2048 sha256 January 15 , 2024 10 : 4 January 14 , 2037 04 : C Type Valu URI um: IP 192 IP 192 Add new>	i4 : 47 AM i i0 : 00 PM i e SIMATIC.S7-1500.OPC-UA.Applica .168.0.1 .168.1.1	T T T T

NOTE When certificates are created from the global certificate manager, a blank canvas is provided. In contrast, generating certificates directly from the CPU offers templates that streamline the creation process.

Creating a certificate from the CPU does not restrict the certificate to the local certificate manager of the device. With the global security settings activated, these certificates can also be accessed and managed through the global certificate manager.

Replacing certificates

The process of replacing certificates enables the substitution of an existing certificate with a new .p12 certificate while preserving its unique ID within the global certificate manager. The benefits of replacing certificates instead of importing or creating new ones is explained in section 2.3.4.

wcei	rtificate	•						
Jsers\	Siemens	\Desktop\Appli	cation Example\	PLC-1OPCUA-1-4_X.5	09 Certificate_3.	p12 🗲	E	Browse
nforn	nation							
Co	ommon							
ame o	ofsub	PLC-1/OPCUA-	1-4		Private key:	Yes		
	Issuer:	Siemens TIA P	roject - Applicat	ion Example Cer				
Vali	id from ·	1/15/2024			Valid until:	1/14/2037		_
rtifica	ates inv	olved						
	Commo	n name of su	Issuer	Valid to	Use	ed as	Private key	
ID								
ID								
ID								
ID								
ID								

Assigning certificates

When integrating other devices, such as communication processors (CPs), certificates need to be assigned through the global certificate manager. The dialog "Assign certificate with ID x to device" provides the mechanism to transfer certificates to these processors.

As shown in the manual (<u>https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/103948898</u>) of the CP 1243-1, to assign trusted partner certificates to the CP via the global certificate manager:

- 1. Right-click on the desired certificate.
- 2. Select "Assign" in the shortcut menu.
- 3. Mark the device/module in the subsequent dialog.
- 4. Define how the certificate is to be assigned in the "Used as" field:
 - Device certificate (not specified): e.g., for Secure OUC or blocks.
 - Device certificate: Web server certificate.
 - Trusted certificate: e.g., OPC UA.

gn certificate with ID-2 to device				
Name	Used as			
CP 1243-1 (PLC_2)	Not assigned 👻			
	Device certificate (not specified) Device certificate			

Only one certificate per device can be used as a "Device certificate". Once assigned, the certificate appears in the "Certificates of the partner devices" table in the local certificate manager of the module.

2.3.4 Loading certificates to the CPU during runtime

Downloading certificates to the CPU is part of the hardware configuration. Traditionally, applying changes to the hardware configuration requires the CPU to be in STOP mode, which, in turn, halts production processes. However, with TIA V19 and FW 3.1, new certificates can be loaded to the CPU during runtime.

To do so, new certificates need to have the same certificate ID in the global certificate manager as the ones already loaded on the device. The only available means to generate new certificates with matching IDs are the "Renew" and "Replace" methods.



NOTE To upload certificates, users must be logged in with an admin account. Newly created admin users need to sign out and log in again to be able to load certificates during runtime.

2.4 Certificates in the scope of OPC UA communication

2.4.1 Overview on OPC UA communication

Description

OPC UA communication in S7-1200/S7-1500 CPUs follows a client-server approach. In this model, servers provide services such as read, write, browse, subscribe, and more, enabling clients to access data stored in their AddressSpace.

For a secure connection to be established, the client must validate and accept the digital certificate presented by the server, deeming it trustworthy. Simultaneously, the server is required to verify the certificate provided by the client, ensuring mutual authentication.

Once the secure connection is established via the Public Key Infrastructure, a shared key is transmitted, and communication transitions to symmetric encryption.

OPC UA certificates

OPC UA certificates adhere to the format specified by X-509 Version 3 of the ITU (International Telecommunication Union) for the authentication of client and server.

When a connection is being established between both entities, the devices check all information from the certificate that is required to determine its integrity, such as signature, period of validity, application name (URI) and, in case of firmware version V2.5 (S7-1500 CPU), also the IP address of the client.

2.4.2 Security settings for the OPC UA server

Security policies and security modes

Server endpoints can be configured with different "SecurityModes" and "SecurityPolicies".

SecurityMode	Description
None	No security is applied, and communication is in plaintext.
Sign	Sign security mode ensures message integrity by adding a digital signature to each message. The signature is generated using the private key of the sender and can be verified using the sender's public key. This ensures that the message has not been tampered with during transmission.
Sign & Encrypt	Sign&Encrypt security mode provides both message integrity and confidentiality. In addition to generating a digital signature, this mode encrypts the message to prevent unauthorized access or reading of the message content. The encryption is performed using a shared secret key that is negotiated between the sender and receiver during the communication process.

SecurityPolicy	Description
None	No security is applied, and communication is in plaintext.
Basic128Rsa15 (deprecated)	128-bit encryption keys and RSA 15 encryption algorithm.
Basic256 (deprecated)	256-bit encryption keys and AES encryption algorithm.
Basic256Sha256	256-bit encryption keys and SHA-256 hashing algorithm.
Aes128Sha256RsaOaep	Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128-bit key size and SHA- 256 hashing algorithm, and RSA with Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) for key exchange.
Aes256Sha256RsaPss	AES with 256-bit key size and SHA-256 hashing algorithm for message integrity, and RSA with Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) for key exchange.

User authentication

In addition to transport layer security, OPC UA can use application-based security to control access to the server, known as authentication. This mechanism is performed each time a new session is activated.

During this process, the client is given a "userIdentityToken", which allows the server to determine if the token is authorized to establish a connection. This introduces an additional layer of security, as not only the client certificate needs to be trusted, but also a valid token must be provided for user authentication.

There are several types of user authentication methods in OPC UA, including:

Token	Description
Anonymous	Clients can connect to the server without providing any user identity.
Username and password	Clients provide a username and password, which are authenticated by the server.
X-509 Certificate	Clients provide a digital certificate that is validated by the server.

NOTE

Since S7-1200/S7-1500 CPUs do not support user authentication through X-509 certificates, no additional information will be provided in this document.

2.4.3 Setting up the OPC UA server

Commissioning an OPC UA server

For security reasons, the OPC UA server is not enabled by default. To activate the server of the CPU, proceed as follows:

1. Select the CPU in the project tree and navigate to the "Properties" tab.



2. Navigate to the entry "OPC UA > Server". Activate the server and confirm the security message.



 In "OPC UA > Server > Security > Secure channel", select the server endpoints that will be available for OPC UA clients (security policies and modes).

LC_1 [CPU 1516F-3 PN/DP]			
General IO tags	System const	tants Texts	7
✓ OPC UA	~		
General		Security policies	available on the server for the secure channel:
▼ Server			
General		Activate sec	Name
Options			No security
▼ Security			Basic128Rsa15 - Sign
Secure channel			Basic128Rsa15 - Sign & Encrypt
Certificates	4		Basic256 - Sign
Diagnostics			Basic256 - Sign & Encrypt
Export	►		Basic256Sha256 - Sign
Client			Basic256Sha256 - Sign & Encrypt
 System power supply 			Aes128-Sha256-RsaOaep - Sign
Advanced configuration			Aes128Sha256RsaOaep - Sign & Encrypt
Connection resources	=		Aes256Sha256RsaPss - Sign
Overview of addresses			Aes256Sha256RsaPss - Sign & Encrypt
Runtime licenses			

 By default, a server certificate is automatically generated in the local certificate manager of the device. As can be seen <u>here</u>, the certificate shown below is issued by TIA's Certification Authority (ID=2).

PLC_1 [CPU 1516F-3 PN/DP]	
General IO tags	System constants Texts
✓ OPC UA	
General	>> Certificates
✓ Server	Use certificates configured and downloaded using TIA Portal
General	
Options	Server certificate
 Security 	
Secure channel	The global security settings for the certificate manager are enabled.
Certificates	 Sufficient function rights or project protection are required to work with the certifi
Diagnostics	The server certificate is used to verify the servers identity when it is accessed and to en
Export	
Client	Server certificate: PLC-1/OPCUA-1-5

 Beneath the server's certificate is the store for trusted OPC UA clients. To restrict connections exclusively to trusted clients, the "Automatically accept client certificates during runtime" checkbox must be disabled.



6. Select the area "Runtime licenses" in the CPU properties and set the purchased runtime license for the OPC UA server in the selection list "Type of purchased license".

General	IO tags	System	constants Texts
Option Securit	s y	^	OPC UA
Cert	ificates		
Export	stics		Type of purchased license: SIMATIC OPC UA 57-1500 medium Type of purchased license: SIMATIC OPC UA 57-1500 medium
 Client System power 	er supply		No license SIMATIC OPC UA 57-1500 small
Advanced co	nfiguration esources		SIMATIC OPC UA 57-1500 medium SIMATIC OPC UA 57-1500 large
Overview of a	addresses		
OPC UA	1565		
ProDiag Energy Su	ite		
MAC			

User authentication

CPUs with firmware version 3.1 do not provide the option to manage user access directly from the CPU settings. To create a new user with "OPC UA server access":

1. Double click on "Security settings > Users and roles" and open the "Roles" tab. Click on "<Add new role>".

Project tree 🔲 🖣	ication Example Certificate N	Aanagement ► Security se	ttings ▶ Users	and roles 🛛 🗖 🔳 🗙
Devices Plant objects	1	🕴 L	Jsers 🚻 Use	er gr 🖍 s Roles
1 III III III III III III III III III I				2
	Roles		<	
 Application Example Certificate Manage 	Name	Description	Runtime timeout	
🗳 Add new device	🙀 Engineering administrator	System-defined role "Engine	30 Min 🔷	Eng ering administrator
Devices & networks	👔 Engineering standard	System-defined role "Engine	30 Min	Engineering standard role
• 1 PLC_1 [CPU 1516F-3 PN/DP]	HMI Administrator	System-defined role "HMI Ad	30 Min	User management, Monit
Image:	HMI Operator	System-defined role "HMI Op	30 Min	Web access, Operate, HMI
🔻 📷 Security settings	HMI Monitor	System-defined role "HMI Mo	30 Min	Web access, Monitor, HMI
🙀 Settings	🙀 HMI Monitor Client	System-defined role "HMI Mo	30 Min	WinCC Unified Client Moni
🗰 Users and roles	🙀 HMI Online Configuration E	System-defined role "HMI On	30 Min	Operate HMI, read and wri
Security features	💡 NET Administrator	System-defined role "NET Ad	30 Min	
👷 Certificate manager	💡 NET Standard	System-d role "NET Sta	. 30 Min	
Firewall	🙀 NET Diagnose	Syster 3 e "NET Dia	. 30 Min	
VPN groups	<add new="" role=""></add>			

2. Create a new role for an OPC UA user. Select "OPC UA server access" from the "Runtime rights" of the target CPU.

		1	
	12 opcua user	User-defined role	30 Min 🜩
	<		>
Γ	Engineering rights	Runtime rights User-sp	pecific runtime rights
	Function rights c	Function rights	
•	Runtime rights	Name	Group
	 \$7-1500 V3.1 (fail 	HMI access	Access level
Ľ	PLC_1	Read access	Access level
		Full access	Access level
		Full access including fail-s	afe Access level 2
		OPC UA server access	OPC UA
		User authentication of the	OPC UA OPC UA
		Manage certificates	OPC UA

3. "Add a new local user" and assign it a username and password. Select the role with OPC UA server access.



NOTE

While not advisable, it is possible to implement anonymous user authentication by activating the default "Anonymous" user and assigning it the recently created "opcua user" role.

View the server certificate

In section 2.3.3, the CPU was set up with the global security settings. As a result, the server's certificate can be managed through the global certificate manager, where it can be found under the "Certificate authority (CA)" and "Device certificates" tabs.

								- 250
		📍 Ce	ertificate authority (CA)	P Device certificate	s 😥 Trusted ce	ertifica	tes and	root ce
•								
Cer	tificate authority (CA)							
D	Common name of subject	Serial nu	Issuer	Valid to	Used as	Pri	Signat	Key ler
1	Siemens TIA Project - Appli	0D51425	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App	Saturday, January 10	Certification authorit	Yes	RSA-S	2048 E
2	 Siemens TIA Project - Appli 	73AE492	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App	Saturday, January 10	Certification authorit	Yes	RSA-S	2048 E
5	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-5	1E4E100	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App	Thursday, January 15	Not assigned	Yes	RSA-S	2048 B
3	 Siemens TIA Project- Applic 	7CBD92D	CN = Siemens TIA Project- Appl	Thursday, January 15	Certification authorit	Yes	ecdsa	256 Bi
4	PLC-1/Communication-4	EECEEE4	Chi Ciamana TA Project Anal		A			256.0
	- Le neonmunication4	DDCEDE4	CN = Siemens IIA Project-Appl	Thursday, January 15	Not assigned	Yes	ecdsa	256 B
olic	ation Example Certificate Ma	inager) S	ecurity features > Certifica	ate manager	Not assigned	Yes ertifica	ecosa	root co
olic	ation Example Certificate Ma	inager ► S	ecurity features > Certificate authority (CA)	ate manager	Not assigned	Yes ertifica	ecosa ites and	root co
olic Dev	ation Example Certificate Ma	inager ► S	ecurity features ► Certificate authority (CA)	ihursday, January 15 ate manager ? Device certificate	Not assigned	Yes ertifica	tes and	root ce
Dev Dev	ation Example Certificate Ma vice certificates	inager ► S	ecurity features → Certifica ertificate authority (CA)	Thursday, January 15 ate manager 2 Device certificate Serial number issuer	Not assigned	ertifica	tes and	root co
Dic Dev Dev 4	ation Example Certificate Ma vice certificates Common name of subject PLC-1/Communication-4	serial nu	ecurity features > Certifica ertificate authority (CA)	Thursday, January 15 ate manager 2 Device certificate Serial number issuer 7CBD92DA30F69210	Not assigned	Yes ertifica ised as lot assig	ites and	256 Bit root ce Pri Ye

Create a new server certificate

If the server certificate was deleted due to the activation of the global security settings, proceed as follows to generate a new certificate for the server:

- 1. Select the entry "OPC UA > Server > Security > Certificates" in the navigation area.
- 2. To generate a new server certificate or substitute it with an existing one, click on the button integrated in the "Server certificate" drop-down list.



3. A dialog appears with all available server certificates. To create a new certificate, click on the "Create" button.

ID	Common name of subject	Issuer	Valid until
4	PLC-1/Communication-4	O=Siemens, C=DE, CN=S	1/15/2037
5	PLC-1/OPCUA-1-5	O=Siemens, C=DE, CN=S	1/15/2037
		\wedge	
I			
			te 🗸 🗙
	Ň		

4. The dialog "Create certificate" appears. Automatically, the certificate is assigned with the necessary Subject Alternativ Name (SAN) fields.

Purpose			
Usage:	OpcUa Server		•
Key usage:	Non Repudiation, I Data Enciphermer	Digital Signature, Key Encipherment nt	
Certificate authority (CA)			
elect how the new certificate will be	e sianed:		
Selfsigned			
Signed by certification authority			
,,			
CA name:	(ID = 2) Siemens T	IA Project - Application Example Cert	ificate M Select
nter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject:	rtificate: PLC-1/OPCUA Serve	er	
Encryption method:	RSA		-
Key length:	2048		•
Hash algorithm:	sha256		•
Valid from:	January 16, 202	4 10:30:37 AM	•
Valid until:	January 15, 203	7 04:00:00 PM	•
Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	Туре	Value	
	URI	urn:SIMATIC.S7-1500.OPC-UA.Ap 192.168.0.1	oplica
	IP	192.168.1.1	
	<add new=""></add>		
	<	111	>
		\wedge	

 If the new certificate is issued by a Certificate Authority, the CA's certificate must be transferred to the "trusted device certificates" within the CPU's local certificate manager. This is done automatically when the project is compiled.
 PLC_1 [CPU 1516-3 PN/DP]

General IO tags Sy	ystem co	onstants	Texts			
 Protection & Security 	~					
Protection of the PLC configu						
Access control		Certifica	tes of the	partner devices		
 Connection mechanisms 						
Connection mechanisms				Note: The certificates	of the partners may be need	ded to prove yo
 Certificate manager 						
Certificate manager						
Certificate management			D Commo	n name of subject	Issuer	Valid until
▼ Syslog	-	2) 3	3 Siemen	s TIA Project- Project1- (EC)-3	O=Siemens, C=DE, CN=S	2/12/2037
Syslog server		2, 2	2 Siemen	s TIA Project - Project1	O=Siemens, C=DE, CN=S	2/12/2037
Certificates for Syslog			<add ne<="" td=""><td>W></td><td></td><td></td></add>	W>		
Security event						

2.4.4 Setting up the OPC UA client

Description

In this application example, UaExpert is used as an OPC UA client. Developed by Unified Automation, UaExpert is an easy-to-use, out-of-the-box software application that acts as a client and allows users to access and test connections with OPC UA servers.

Creation of the client's certificate

By default, UaExpert generates its own self-signed certificate. To ensure a secure connection with the OPC UA server, it is necessary to import this certificate into the local certificate manager of the CPU, designating it as a trusted device certificate.

However, to take advantage of the trust chain associated with Certificate Authorities, a new certificate for UaExpert will be generated using the default CA from TIA's certificate manager (ID=2), thereby granting it direct trust and access.

To create the client's certificate:

1. Open the global certificate manager. Right-click on an empty row and select "Create" from the context menu.



- 2. In the "Create certificate" window, insert all fields needed to generate the certificate. The Subject Alternative Names for this certificate are:
 - URI: urn:[PC_Hostname]:UnifiedAutomation:UaExpert
 - IP: [IP Address of the client]
 - DNS: [PC_Hostname]

NOTE

To establish a secure connection with OPC UA servers running on SIMATIC PLCs, client certificates only require the URI field. For PLCs operating on FW version 2.5, the IP is also mandatory.

While some fields are optional, it is advisable to include them all, as other communication partners may consider them compulsory.

Purpose				
Usage:	OpcUa Client		•	
Key usage:	Non Repudiation, Digi Data Encipherment	tal Signature, Key Encipher	ment, ^	
Certificate authority (CA)				
elect how the new certificate will be	signed:			
Selfsigned	<u>,</u>			
Signed by certification authority				
Jongheo by certification additional				
CA name:	(ID = 2) Siemens TIA P	roject - Application Example	e Certificate M	Select
Certificate parameter	tificate:	J		
Certificate parameter inter the parameters for the new cer Common name of subject:	tificate: UaExpert/OPCUA Clien	ιŧ		
Certificate parameter Inter the parameters for the new cer Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key lenoth:	tificate: UaExpert/OPCUA Clien RSA 2048	ιŧ		
Certificate parameter Enter the parameters for the new cer Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm:	tificate: UaExpert/OPCUA Clien RSA 2048 sha256	ιų		
Certificate parameter Inter the parameters for the new cer Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from:	tificate: UaExpert/OPCUA Clien RSA 2048 sha256 January 16 , 2024 (ฟ 04 : 46 : 13 PM		
Certificate parameter Inter the parameters for the new cer Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until:	tificate: UaExpert/OPCUA Clien RSA 2048 sha256 January 16 , 2024 (January 15 , 2037 (η 04 : 46 : 13 PM 04 : 00 : 00 PM	× × ×	
Certificate parameter Inter the parameters for the new cert Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	tificate: UaExpert/OPCUA Clien RSA 2048 sha256 January 16, 2024 (January 15, 2037 (Type	nd D4 : 46 : 13 PM D4 : 00 : 00 PM Value	× • •	
Certificate parameter Inter the parameters for the new cert Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	tificate: UaExpert/OPCUA Clien RSA 2048 sha256 January 16 , 2024 (January 15 , 2037 (Type URI	nt D4 : 46 : 13 PM D4 : 00 : 00 PM Value J um:desktop-f0efhml:Unifi	V V V V	
Certificate parameter Inter the parameters for the new cer Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	tificate: UaExpert/OPCUA Clien RSA 2048 sha256 January 16 , 2024 (January 15 , 2037 (Type URI IP	nt 04 : 46 : 13 PM 04 : 00 : 00 PM Value J um:desktop-f0efhml:Unifi 127.0.0.1	v v v edAutomati	
Certificate parameter Inter the parameters for the new cer Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid notil: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	tificate: UaExpert/OPCUA Clien RSA 2048 sha256 January 16, 2024 (January 15, 2037 (Type URI IP DNS	14 04 : 46 : 13 PM 04 : 00 : 00 PM Value Jurn:desktop-f0efhml:Unifi 127.0.0.1 desktop-f0efhml	v v v edAutomati	
Certificate parameter inter the parameters for the new cer Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	tificate: UaExpert/OPCUA Clien RSA 2048 sha256 January 16, 2024 (January 15, 2037 (Type URI IP DNS <add new=""></add>	14 04 : 46 : 13 PM 04 : 00 : 00 PM Value J um:desktop-f0efhml:Unifi 127.0.0.1 desktop-f0efhml	v v v edAutomati	

3. Upon generating the client's certificate, export it in .der format with the name "uaexpert.der," excluding the private key from the export.



Organize View folder	III ▼ Date modified
Certificates ^ Name 2 ^	Date modified
File name: uaexpert 🔎	
Save as type: Certificate - DER coded (unencrypter er)	
Hide Folders	Save Cancel

4. To sign and decrypt messages, the client also requires the matching private key. Repeat the steps to export the private key in .pem format. Save the key without encryption and rename it as "uaexpert_key.pem" to ensure that UaExpert can read it.



5. Navigate to the "Settings" tab in UaExpert and select "Manage certificates...". A pop-up window appears, presenting UaExpert's self-signed certificate, along with trusted certificates, trusted issuers/CAs, and more.



6. Navigate to the "own > certs" folder and copy the newly created certificate. Repeat the process with the private key in the folder "own > private".

File Home SI	nare Viev	N					
- → × ↑ <mark>.</mark> >	Siemens >	AppData → Roaming	g > unifiedautom	ation > uaexpert > PKI > ow	n → certs	√ Č	Search ce
🕹 Downloads	* ^	Name	^	Date modified	Туре	Size	
🗄 Documents	*	🗔 uaexpert		16/01/2024 17:06	Security Certifi	cate	2 KB
Pictures	*				2		
🗳 📙 🚽 privat	e						
II <mark>→</mark> = I privat	ie hare Viev	N					
IIII = File File Home Si - → × ↑ IIII	te hare Viev Siemens →	v AppData > Roaming	g > unifiedautom	ation > uaexpert > PKI > own	n → private	دي ان م	Search p
I Image: Imag	te hare Viev Siemens → ★ ^	v AppData > Roaminy Name	g → unifiedautom	ation > uaexpert > PKI > own	n > private Type	✓ Č Size	Search p
I Image: Imag	te hare Viev Siemens > * ^	v AppData → Roaminy Name ≁ uaexpert_key	g > unifiedautom	ation → uaexpert → PKI → own Date modified 16/01/2024 17:07	n > private Type Privacy Enhanc	v Č) Size	Search p 4 KB

NOTE

Private keys must always remain secret. They should only be exported if necessary and protected with a password.

Import the CA to UaExpert

Finally, to establish a trust relationship with the CA, and all certificates issued by it, import the root certificate into UaExpert as a trusted partner.

1. Open the global certificate manager. Export the Certification Authority with ID=2 as a .der file. Do not include the private key in the export.



2. Export the revocation list of the CA.



3. Navigate to the "trusted > certs" folder and copy the root certificate. Repeat the process with the revocation list in the folder "trusted > crl".

📊 🛃 🚽 🚽 🖓 certs			
File Home Share View	v		
← → × ↑ 📙 > Siemens >	AppData > Roaming > unifiedautomation > uaexpert > PKI	> trusted ⇒ certs	✓ ひ Search certs
A Quick access	Name	Type Security Certificate	Size 2 KB
📕 Desktop 🛛 🖈			
File Home Share View	v		
🗲 🔶 👻 🛧 🔂 > Siemens >	AppData > Roaming > unifiedautomation > uaexpert > PKI	\rightarrow trusted \rightarrow crl	✓ 🖸 Search crl
▲	Name 🛹 Revocation List ID 2.crl	Type X.509 Certificate R	Size 1 KB

2.4.5 Testing a secure OPC UA connection

After configuring the OPC UA server and client, follow these steps to establish a connection between UaExpert and the CPU.

1. Click the "Add Server" button and then double-click on "<Double click to Add Server...>". A dialog will appear to input the OPC UA server's URL running on the CPU.

Unified Automation UaExpert - The	e OPC Unified Architecture Client - NewProject		
File View Server Document	Settings Help		
🗋 💋 🗟 🖉 🖉 🔮			
Project	Add Server ?	×	
Address Space	Configuration Name PKI Store Default Discovery Advanced Endpoint Filter: No Filter Q. Local Q. ServersOnNetwork: Coloble Click to Add GDS Server > Q. Custom Discovery Server Q. Custom Discovery Q. Custom Discovery Q. Custom Discovery <td>V Node Id</td> <td></td>	V Node Id	
	Authentication Settings		Enter URL ? X Enter the URL of a computer with discovery service running: opc.tcp://192.168.0.1:4840 OK Cancel

The server endpoints will be displayed under the "Custom Discovery" section. Double-click on the endpoint with the security modes and policies configured earlier. This will add the server to the project.



3. Select the OPC UA server and click on the "Connect server" button. Insert the username and password to perform the user authentication.



As a result, the OPC UA client establishes a connection with the server, enabling secure access to the information stored within its AddressSpace.



2.4.6 OPC UA certificate handling scenarios–where does each certificate belong?

Description

This chapter concludes with a set of diagrams designed to highlight the correct handling of certificates and private keys in diverse OPC UA communication scenarios. These illustrations should be used as a guide to understand when and where certificates, private keys, and revocation lists should be exported.

Scenario 1

Using the default Certification Authorities in the global certificate manager to issue certificates for servers (CPU) and clients (external application).



Scenario 2

Using an external Certificate Authority managed within TIA Portal's Certificate Manager.

Workflow



Where does each certificate belong?



Scenario 3

Using a central certificate manager to issue and manage certificates for clients and servers. The Certificate Authority can belong to the user/company or to a third-party corporation such as DigiCert or RapidSSL among many others.



2.5 Certificates in the scope of HTTPS web server communication

2.5.1 Overview on HTTPS communication

Description

The foundation of HTTPS security lies in the TLS protocol, requiring the presence of certificates on those devices running web servers. To prevent unsecure connections with web servers, CPUs must be configured to exclusively allow access through HTTPS.

In contrast to OPC UA, which mandates mutual authentication and trust, HTTPS places the trust burden solely on the client, which must verify the validity of the web server's certificate.

NOTE

Self-signed certificates lack trustworthiness in web browsers. This is because web browsers operate on a trust model that relies on Certificate Authorities. Therefore, web server certificates must be issued by recognized CAs whose certificates are trusted within the web browser settings.

HTTPS certificates

In the context of web servers, X-509 version 3 certificates are commonly used to secure communication over HTTPS. These certificates are issued by Certificate Authorities and provide the trusted means to establish the identity of the server to the client, using asymmetric cryptography before transitioning to symmetric encryption.

2.5.2 Setting up the web server

Commissioning of the web server

To configure the web server using HTTPS, the next steps must be followed:

1. Select the CPU in the project tree and navigate to the "Properties" tab.



In the navigation area of the "Properties" tab, select the "Web Server" entry. Activate the
option "Activate web server on this module" and the option "Permit access only with
HTTPS". Confirm the security message.



 By default, a server certificate is automatically generated in the local certificate manager of the device. As can be seen <u>here</u>, the certificate is issued by a new Certification Authority with ID=3.

LC_1 [CPU 1516F-3 PN/DP]					
General IO tags	Syst	em cons	tants	Texts	
✓ Web server	^	Security	/		
General					
Automatic update			The globa	Isecurityset	tings for the certificate manager are enabled
Security			Sufficient	function right	ts or project protection are required to work with the
Watch tables			The serve	r certificate is	s used to verify the servers identity when it is access
User-defined pages					
Entry page			Serve	r certificate:	PLC-1/Webserver-8
Overview of interfaces	≡ ⁴				

The web server's certificate can be found in the global certificate manager, under the "Certificate authority (CA)" and "Device certificates" tabs. In this case, the root certificate with ID=3 has issued the web server certificate as well as the secure PG-HMI communication.

Application Example Certificate Manager 🔸 Security features 🕨 Certificate manager 🛛 💶 🖬 🗮 🗙											
	💽 Certificate authority (CA) 💽 Device certificates 🛛 💽 Trusted certificates and root cert										
*	•										
Certificate authority (CA)											
	ID	Common name of subject	Serial nu	Issuer	Valid to	Used as	Pri	Signat	Key length		
	1	Siemens TIA Project - Appli	0D51425	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App	Saturday, January 10	Certification authorit	Yes	RSA-S	2048 Bit		
	2	Siemens TIA Project - Appli	73AE492	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App	Saturday, January 10	Certification authorit	Yes	RSA-S	2048 Bit		
	3	▼ Siemens TIA Project- Applic	7CBD92D	CN = Siemens TIA Project- Appl	Thursday, January 15	Certification authorit	Yes	ecdsa	256 Bit		
	4	PLC-1/Communication-4	7E4BA2C	CN = Siemens TIA Project- Appl	Friday, January 16, 2	Not assigned	Yes	ecdsa	256 Bit		
	8	PLC-1/Webserver-8	3434F8A	CN = Siemens TIA Project- Appl	Friday, January 16, 2	Notassigned	Yes	ecdsa	256 Bit		
	- C	1									

User authentication

Like OPC UA, web server access can be controlled through user authentication. To create a new user with "Web server" access rights:

1. Double click on "Security settings > Users and roles" and navigate to the "Roles" tab. Click on "<Add new role>". From the "Runtime rights" of the target CPU, assign those web server rights strictly required by the user.

Roles				
Name	Description	Runtime timeout	Comment	
🙀 HMI Online Configuration Engine	er System-defined role "HMI Online	e C 30 Min	Operate HMI, read	
🙀 NET Administrator	System-defined role "NET Admin	iis 30 Min		
🙀 NET Standard	System-defined role "NET Stand	ard" 30 Min		
🙀 NET Diagnose	System-defined role "NET Diagn	os 30 Min		
1 opcua user	User-defined role	30 Min		
1 webserver user	User-defined role	30 Min 🌲]	
Engineering rights Runtime	rights User-specific runti	me rights		
Function rights c Function	on rights			
 Runtime rights Nan 	ne	Group		
▼ S7-1500 V3.1 (fail Use	r authentication of the OPC UA	OPC UA		
PLC_1 Mar	nage certificates	OPC UA		
Cha	inge operating mode	Web server - General		
Cha	inge default page of the web s	Web server - General		
Cha	inge parameter of the F-Syste 📒	Neb server - General		
Rea	d out diagnostics	Web server - PLC diag	nostics	
Ack	nowledge alarms	Web server - PLC diag	nostics	
Rea	d out Syslog buffer of the CPU	Web server - PLC diag	nostics	
Flas	sh LEDs	Web server - PLC diag	nostics	
Upc	late firmware	Web server - Maintena	ance	
2 Cha	inge time settings	Web server - Maintena	ance	
< 📷 🔪 🗹 Cre	ate a backup of the CPU	Web server - Maintena	ance	
Res Res	tore the CPU using a backup file	Web server - Maintena	ance	
Dov	vnload service data	Webserver - Maintena	ance	
Rea	d process data	Web server - Access to	o process data	
Re a	d process data of the watch ta	Web server - Access t	o process data	
Writ	te process data	Web server - Access t	o process data	
Writ	te process data of the watch ta	Web server - Access to	o process data	
Ope	en user-defined web pages	Web server - User-def	ined web pages	
Ma i	nage user-defined web pages	Web server - User-def	ined web pages	
Writ	e process data through comm	Web server - User-def	ined web pages	
Rea	d files	Web server - Access to	o file browser	
Writ	te/delete files	Web server - Access t	o file browser	

2. Assign the new role to a user. Compile and download the project to the CPU.

Users				
User name	Password	Runtime	timeout U	M domain ID
🛉 📃 Anonymous				
🛉 🗹 admin	*****	3 0	Min	
🕴 🗹 User	*****	💌 🛃 30	Min 🌲	
<				
		▲ I ▼ I		
Assigned user groups Assig	ned roles Assigned right	ts		
Assigned roles				
Assigned to Name	Description		Runtime timeo	ut Comment
1 opcua user	User-defined role	e	30 N	fin
User name Password Runtime timeout UM domain ID Anonymous 30 Min admin 30 Min User 30 Min Assigned user groups Assigned roles Assigned rights Assigned to les Assigned to Name Description Runtime timeout Comment User-defined role 30 Min User-defined role 30 Min User-defined role 30 Min				
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				

2.5.3 Setting up the web browser

Description

In this Application Example, Microsoft Edge has been selected as the browser to establish the connection with the web server.

Configuration

For Microsoft Edge to trust the web server's certificate, it needs to establish a trust relationship with the CA. For this, it is necessary to export the root certificate from TIA Portal and import it into Windows' certificate store.

1. To export the root certificate from the global certificate manager, right-click on the CA and select the "Show" option. Once the certificate is opened, click on "Install Certificate...".

Certi	ificate authority (CA)							
ID	Common name of subject	Serial nu	Issuer	Valid to	Used as	Pri	Signat	Key length
1	Siemens TIA Project - Appli	0D51425	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App.	. Saturday, January 10	Certification authorit	Yes	RSA-S	2048 Bit
2	 Siemens TIA Project - Appli 	73AE492	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App.	. Saturday, January 10	Certification authorit	Yes	RSA-S	2048 Bit
3	 Siemens TIA Project- Applic 	7CBD92D	CN – Siemens TIA Coject-Appl.	. Thursday, January 15	Certification authorit	Yes	ecdsa	256 Bit
4	PLC-1/Communication-4	7 Expor	Siemens ct- Appl.	. Friday, January 16, 2	Not assigned	Yes	ecdsa	256 Bit
8	PLC-1/Webserver-8	3 Assig	Siem Appl.	. Friday, January 16, 2	Not assigned	Yes	ecdsa	256 Bit
		Rener						
		Repla	re					
	-							
Certif	ficate		×					
noral								
rierai	Details Certification Path							
-								
	Certificate Information							
This	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·							
This	s certificate is intended for the f	ollowing pur	pose(s):					
	All issuance policies All application policies							
	- All application policies							
a								
	Issued to: Siemens TIA Project-	Application Exa	mple					
	Certificate Manager	3						
	Issued by: Siemens TIA Project- /	Application Exa	mple					
	Certificate Manager-	- -						
	Valid from 16/01/2024 to 16/0	1/2037						
			\sim					
	Install Certif	icate Iss	uer Stater					
	Install Certif	100						
			\sim					
			01					

- 2. The wizard is started. Follow the instructions of the installation wizard.
 - Select the "Local Machine" as the storage location.
 - The wizard issues a security warning, which must be acknowledged with "Yes".
 - Store the certificate in the "Trusted Root Certification Authorities" folder.

The "Finish" button imports the certificate into the selected folder.

🗧 ᡒ Certificate Import Wizard	×
Welcome to the Certificate Import Wizard	
This wizard helps you copy certificates, certificate trust lists, and certificate revocation lists from your disk to a certificate store.	
A certificate, which is issued by a certification authority, is a confirmation of your identity and contains information used to protect data or to establish secure network connections. A certificate store is the system area where certificates are kept.	
Store Location O Current User	
To continue, dick Next.	
	×
 Ertificate Import Wiza 	rd
Certificate Store Certificate stores are s	system areas where certificates are kept.
Windows can automati the certificate.	ically select a certificate store, or you can specify a location for
Automatically se O Automatically se O Place all certificate eters	elect the certificate store based on the type of certificate ates in the following store
Trusted Root 0	Certification Authorities Browse
	×
– 🛿 🐉 Certificate Import Wizard	Next Cancel
Completing the Certificate Import Wizard	
The certificate will be imported after you click Finish.	
You have specified the following settings: Certificate Store Selected by User Trusted Root Certification Authorities Content Certificate	
Finish Can	cel

2.5.4 Testing a secure HTTPS connection

With the CPU running and the root certificate imported into Windows' certificate store, establish a connection to the web server using the following URL: https://[CPU IP Address].

As shown in the image below, the connection is secured by TLS, and the web server's certificate is considered trustworthy.



To test the user authentication, press the "ENTER" button. As observed, anonymous users have limited access to the information displayed on the web server.

S7-1500/ET20	00MP station_1 × +			
← C 🕆 https://	/192.168.0.1/Portal/Portal.mwsl?intro_en	er_button=ENTER&PriNav=S	Start&coming_from_intro=true	
SIEMENS	\$7 1500/ET200MP station 1/PL	2.4		
SIEWIENS	S7-1500/E1200MF Station_I/FE	I		
User name Log in	PLC_1			
▶ Start page	1518 ² -3 PNDP			
		General:		
 Introduction 	SIEMENS SIMATIC S7-1500	Project name: Appli	lication Example Certificate Manager	
• maoducaon	RUN	TIA Portal: V19.	.0.0.0	
	CPU 1516F-3 PN/DP	Step 7 Safety: V19		
		Station name: S7-1	1500/ET200MP station_1	
	and the second	Module name: PLC	<u>L</u> 1	
		Module type: CPU	J 1516F-3 PN/DP	
	6ES7 516-3FP03-0AB0	Status:		
		Operating Mode: RUN	N OK	
		Status: 🗸 C	UK	
		Mode selector: RUN	N	
		-		
	ESC OK	Fail-safe:		
		Safety mode: Enal	bled	
		Collective F-signature: 9a07	773bd	
		Last fail-safe modification: 01/0	01/2012 03:47:37.893 am	

After logging in with username and password, the web server checks the user's rights and grants it access to further features.

S7-1500/ET	200MP station_1 × +		
← C ⊡ https:	//192.168.0.1/Portal/Portal.mwsl?PriNav=Online&SecNav=RuntimeInfo		
SIEMENS	S7-1500/ET200MP station_1/PLC_1		
User: User Log.out	Diagnostics		
 Start page 	Identification Program protection Memory Runtime information Fail-safe		-
Diagnostics	Program-/Communication load	Cycle time	
Diagnostic Buffer	Value refresh: Every second	Shortest cycle time:	1.014 ms
Diagnostic Duiler	Measurement: Current measurement	Current cycle time:	1.027 ms
Motion Control	*Program load cyclic program OBs: 4%	Longest cycle time:	1.438 ms
ulagnostics	**Program load high-priority OBs: 0%	Configured min. cycle time:	1 ms
Module information	***Current communication load: 6%	Configured max. cycle time:	150 ms
Alarms	Maximum permissible communication load: 20%		
	No-load operation: 90%		
Communication			
Topology	Measurement or road distribution and cycle unie	Trend for program/communication load	
▶ Tag status	6% 90%	Number of recorded measuring points:	200
		100	
Watch tables		20	
Online backup	Cycle time: 1.027ms		
Trace		80	
Thate	Prognosis of load distribution and cycle time	40	
 DataLogs 	0% 20% 100%	20-	
 User Files 	30% 4/		
Liess defined names		2 4 6 8	
 User-defined pages 	Predicted cycle time: ~ 1ms (max. 150ms)	Samples	
 Filebrowser 	The user program can be processed within the maximum cycle time with at least 30% of the maximum cycle time still being available as reserve.		
▶ Introduction	*Runtime of the program cycle OBs including system tasks (e.g. update of the process image), calculated **Runtime of all OBs with higher priority than the program cycle OBs, calculated as anthmetic mean value **Communication load calculated as antimetic mean of the last second ****Measurement with the longest cycle time observed in the Web server (not the longest cycle time reco	I as arithmetic mean of the last second of the last second rided by the PLC)	

2.5.5 HTTPS certificate handling scenarios–where does each certificate belong?

Description

The chapter concludes with a set of diagrams designed to highlight the correct handling of certificates and private keys in diverse HTTPS communication scenarios. These diagrams do not include any client certificates in the web browser, as HTTPS does not often require them for client authentication.

Scenario 1

Using TIA Portal's default CAs in the Certificate Manager to issue certificates for web servers.



Scenario 2

Using an external Certificate Authority managed within TIA's Certificate Manager.



Scenario 3

Using a central certificate manager to issue and manage certificates for the web server. The Certificate Authority can belong to the user/company or to a third-party corporation such as DigiCert or RapidSSL among many others.



2.6 Certificates in the scope of Secure OUC communication

2.6.1 Overview on Open User Communication

Description

Open User Communication is an open standard that enables communication between SIMATIC CPUs as well as with suitable third-party devices. It supports various communication protocols, some of which can be secured through TLS v1.2 and v1.3.

Transport protocol	Via interface
ТСР	PROFINET/IE
ISO-on-TCP	PROFINET/IE
ISO	Industrial Ethernet (only CP 1543-1)
UDP	PROFINET/IE
FDL	PROFIBUS

Application protocol	Used transport protocol
Modbus TCP	ТСР
E-Mail	ТСР
FTP	ТСР

The application example titled "Basic Examples for Open User Communication (OUC)" provides in-depth details on establishing non-secure OUC, focusing on ISO-on-TCP, TCP and UDP communication protocols. (https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/109747710)

OUC certificates

Secure OUC employs X-509 v3 certificates with key usage and subject alternative names that comply with TLS requirements. In this configuration, one device functions as a server and opens a designated port to establish the TCP connection, while a second device, the TLS client, initiates and establishes the connection with the server through this port.

Like web servers, only the client side is required to trust the server's certificate. However, users can modify this setting, making it mandatory to establish a mutual trust relationship between server and client.

2.6.2 Setting up the TLS server

Description

In this application example, the CPU will be used as a TLS server. To communicate with it, a second PLC will be configured as a TLS client.

To implement the Secure Open User Communication, the function blocks "TRCV_C" and "TSEND_C" will be utilized in the Main Organization Block (OB) of both the server and client. These blocks combine the functionalities of TCON (connect), TRCV (receive) / TSEND (send), and TDISCON (disconnect) into a single, integrated block.

Creation of the server's certificate

To set up a TLS server in the CPU, the first step is to create a new TLS client/server certificate:

1. Select the CPU in the project tree and navigate to the "Properties" tab.



 Navigate to the entry "Protection & Security > Certificate manager > Certificate management with TIA Portal" and create a new certificate in the "Device certificates" section.



3. Select the usage "TLS Client/Server" and choose a Certification Authority to issue the certificate. The Subject Alternative Names (SANs) are automatically generated.

Purpose				
Usage:	TLS Client / Server		-	
Key usage :	Non Repudiation, D Agreement	igital Signature, Key Enciph	erment, Key 🔨	
Certificate authority (CA) elect how the new certificate will b	e signed:			
) Self signed				
Signed by certification authority				
CA name:	(ID = 3) Siemens TI	A Project- Application Examp	le Certificate Ma	Select
Certificate parameter inter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject:	ertificate: PLC-1/TLS Server			
Certificate parameter Enter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject:	ertificate: PLC-1/TLS Server			
Certificate parameter Enter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject: Encryption method:	ertificate: PLC-1/TLS Server EC			
Certificate parameter Enter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length:	PLC-1/TLS Server EC prime256v1		•	
Certificate parameter Inter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm:	ertificate: PLC-1/TLS Server EC prime256v1 sha256		× × ×	
Certificate parameter Enter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from:	ertificate: PLC-1/TLS Server EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19 , 202 January 18 , 203	4 09:56:04 AM	× × ×	
Certificate parameter Enter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until:	ertificate: PLC-1/TLS Server EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19, 202 January 18, 203	4 09:56:04 AM 7 04:00:00 PM	× × × ×	
Certificate parameter Enter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	PLC-1/TLS Server EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19, 202 January 18, 203 Type IP	4 09 : 56 : 04 AM 7 04 : 00 : 00 PM Value 192 168 0 1	• • • •	
Certificate parameter inter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	PLC-1/TLS Server EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19, 202 January 18, 203 Type IP IP	4 09 : 56 : 04 AM 7 04 : 00 : 00 PM Value 192.168.0.1 192.168.1.1	• • •	
Certificate parameter Enter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	PLC-1/TLS Server EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19 , 202 January 18 , 203 Type IP IP IP Add new>	4 09:56:04 AM 7 04:00:00 PM Value 192.168.0.1 192.168.1.1	• • • •	
Certificate parameter Enter the parameters for the new ce Common name of subject: Encryption method: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	PLC-1/TLS Server EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19, 202 January 18, 203 Type IP IP IP <add new=""></add>	4 09 : 56 : 04 AM 7 04 : 00 : 00 PM Value 192.168.0.1 192.168.1.1	v v v	

Program the OUC communication block

Once the certificate is created, open the "Main" OB of the CPU.

1. In the "Instructions" tab, open the folder "Communication > Open user communication" and drag-and-drop the "TRCV_C" function block to the main program.



This function block requires three main input parameters:

- EN_R (Enable receive): indicates if the server is ready to receive data.
- CONNECT: variable with all necessary connection parameters.
- DATA: variables that will be overwritten with the data being sent by the client.
- To set up the variable with the necessary connection parameters, create a new data block in the project and add a "TCON_IP_V4_SEC" variable. Set up this variable as shown in the image below.



	Sei	ver_0	Lon	nectio	n_Parameters		
-		Name				Data type	Start value
1	-00	▼ St	atic				
2	-00	• •	Se	rver IP_	V4_ConnectionSEC	TCON_IP_V4_SEC	
3	-00		•	ConnP	ara	TCON_IP_v4	
4	-00		•	Inte	erfaceId	HW_ANY	64
5	-		•	ID		CONN_OUC	1
6			•	Co	nnectionType	Byte	11
7	-00		•	Act	tiveEstablished	Bool	false
8	-		•	▼ Rer	moteAddress	IP_V4	
9	-			• •	ADDR	Array[14] of Byte	
10	-				ADDR[1]	Byte	192
11					ADDR[2]	Byte	168
12	-00				ADDR[3]	Byte	0
13	-00				ADDR[4]	Byte	2
14	-00			Rer	motePort	UInt	0
15	-00		•	Loc	alPort	UInt	2000
16				Activa	teSecureConn	Bool	true
17	-			TLSSer	rverReqClientCert	Bool	true
18				ExtTLS	Capabilities	Word	16#0
19	-00			TLSSer	rverCertRef	UDInt	9
20	-			TLSClie	entCertRef	UDInt	3

NOTE

The "TLSServerCertRef" field must contain the ID, specified within the global certificate manager, of the server's certificate.

The "TLSClientCertRef" is configured with the root certificate (ID = 3), as this CA will issue the client's certificate. If the server trusts the CA, it automatically extends that trust to the client.

3. Add a second data block to store the incoming information sent by the client. Configure the data block to operate without "Optimized block access" and include the variables that are intended for transfer during communication.

•	PLC_1 [CPU 1516F-3 PN/DP]						
	Device configuration						
	🖫 Online & diagnostics						
	 Safety Administration 	ſ					
	Software units						
	🔻 🛃 Program blocks						
	📑 Add new block						
	💶 Main [OB1]						
	j Received_Data [DB4]		Received_Data	[DB4]			
	Server_Connection_Param						
	508_RTG1 [08123]		General	Texts			
	🔁 Main_Safety_RTG1 [FB1]		General		1		
	👅 Main_Safety_RTG1_DB (D		Information			Attribut	tes
	System blocks		Time stamps	5			
	🕨 🙀 Technology objects		Compilation				nly store in load memory
	Energy objects		Protection				en blank verien ander en die ekster de vien
	External source files		Attributes				the block white-protected in the device
	🕨 🚂 PLC tags		Download w	ithout reiniti	alizati	E Op	otimized block access
	PLC data types					🛃 Da	ta block accessible from OPC UA
	Watch and force tables				4	🖂 Da	ita block accessible via Web server
	🕨 📴 Online backups				-	_	
	Received Data						
	Necelved_Data	-		0//			
	Name	D	ata type	Offset	Start vi	aiue	
1	📶 🔻 Static						
2	💷 🔍 Var1	B	ool		false		
2	A Var2	c	tring		10		

4. Include the "Server IP_V4_ConnectionSEC" variable into the "CONNECT" field of the function block and drag-and-drop the "Received_Data" DB to the "DATA" field.

To indicate when the server is ready to receive data, add a new tag to the "EN_R" field. Set the "CONT" field to true to maintain the connection alive.



2.6.3 Setting up the TLS client

Commissioning of a new device

As previously mentioned, the TLS client will be running on a second CPU. Therefore, add a new CPU to the project and commission it:

1. Navigate to the "Network view" and assign new IP Addresses to the second CPU.



- Activate the global security settings in the device following the steps covered in section 2.3.3. Renew the secure PG-HMI communication certificate if it was deleted during this step.
- 3. Set up a new user and role with the necessary "Access Level" rights to access the CPU.

Creation of the client's certificate

To set up the TLS client, create a new TLS client/server certificate:

1. Select the CPU in the project tree and navigate to the "Properties" tab.



 Navigate to the entry "Protection and Security > Certificate Manager > Certificate management within TIA Portal" and create a new certificate in the "Device certificate" section. 3. Select the usage "TLS Client/Server" and choose Certification Authority with ID 3 to issue the certificate. The Subject Alternative Names (SANs) are automatically generated.

lisses	T.S. Client / Server		-	
Usage:	its client? server		•	
Key usage:	Non Repudiation, D	igital Signature, Key Enciphe	rment, Key \land	
	Agreement		<u>~</u>	
Certificate authority (CA)				
elect how the new certificate will b	e signed:			
Selfsigned	5			
Signed by certification authority				
y signed by certaication additionly				
CA name:	(ID = 3) Siemens Th	A Project- Application Example	e Certificate Ma Select	t
Encention methods				
Common name of subject:	PLC-2/TLS Client			
Encomption mothody				
Encryption method:	EC		•	
Key length:	EC prime256v1		 ▼ ▼ 	
Key length: Hash algorithm:	EC prime256v1 sha256		▼ ▼	
Keylength: Hash algorithm: Valid from:	EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19, 2024	4 11:31:26 AM	• • •	
Keylength: Keylength: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until:	EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19 , 2024 January 18 , 2037	+ 11:31:26 AM 7 04:00:00 PM	V V V V V V	
Keylength: Keylength: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19, 2024 January 18, 2037 Type	4 11:31:26 AM 7 04:00:00 PM Value	V V V V V	
Key length: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19, 2024 January 18, 2037 Type IP IP	 11:31:26 AM 7 04:00:00 PM Value 192.168.0.2 192.168.1.2 	V V V V V	
Key length: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19 , 2024 January 18 , 2037 Type IP IP IP Add new>	 11:31:26 AM 7 04:00:00 PM Value 192.168.0.2 192.168.1.2 		
Key length: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19, 2024 January 18, 2037 Type IP IP Add new>	 11:31:26 AM 7 04:00:00 PM Value 192.168.0.2 192.168.1.2 		
Key length: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19, 2024 January 18, 2033 Type IP IP Add new>	 11:31:26 AM 7 04:00:00 PM Value 192.168.0.2 192.168.1.2 		
Key length: Key length: Hash algorithm: Valid from: Valid until: Subject Alternative Name (SAN):	EC prime256v1 sha256 January 19 , 2024 January 18 , 2033 Type IP IP IP Add new>	↓ 11 : 31 : 26 AM 7 04 : 00 : 00 PM Value 192.168.0.2 192.168.1.2	▼ ▼ ▼ ▼	

Program the OUC communication block

1. Open the folder "Communication > Open user communication" and drag-and-drop the "TSEND_C" function block to the main program.



This function block requires three main input parameters:

- REQ: trigger to send the data.
- CONNECT: variable with all necessary connection parameters.
- DATA: variables that will be sent by the client.
- To set up the variable with the necessary connection parameters, create a new data block in the project and add a "TCON_IP_V4_SEC" variable. Set up this variable as shown in the image below.

	Client_Connection_Parameters						
		Name				Data type	Start value
1	-00	* 5	Static				
2		•	 Cli 	ient IP_	V4_Connection_SEC	TCON_IP_V4_SEC	
3			•	ConnF	ara	TCON_IP_v4	
4				Int	erfaceId	HW_ANY	64
5				ID		CONN_OUC	1
6				Co	nnectionType	Byte	11
7				Act	tiveEstablished	Bool	true
8				▼ Re	moteAddress	IP_V4	
9				• •	ADDR	Array[14] of Byte	
10					ADDR[1]	Byte	192
11					ADDR[2]	Byte	168
12	-00				ADDR[3]	Byte	0
13					ADDR[4]	Byte	1
14				Re	motePort	UInt	2000
15				Lo	calPort	UInt	0
16				Activa	teSecureConn	Bool	true
17	-			TLSSe	rverReqClientCert	Bool	false
18	-			ExtTLS	Capabilities	Word	16#0
19	-			TLSSe	rverCertRef	UDInt	3
20				TLSCli	entCertRef	UDInt	11

3. Add a second data block to store the information that is going to be sent by the client. Configure the data block to operate without "Optimized block access" and include the variables that are intended for transfer during communication.

	Send_Data						
		Na	me	Data type	Offset	Start value	
1	-00	•	Static				
2		٠	Var1	Bool		false	
3			Var2	String			

4. Include the "Client IP_V4_ConnectionSEC" variable into the "CONNECT" field of the function block and drag-and-drop the "Send_Data" DB to the "DATA" field. To trigger the send data instruction, add a new tag to the "REQ" field. Set the "CONT" field to true to maintain the connection alive.



2.6.4 Testing a Secure OUC communication

Once both devices are configured and running, the Secure Open User Communication can be tested. To establish the connection between server and client:

1. Activate "Enable receive" to allow data reception on the server's side. Confirm that the status of the output field "BUSY" is true.



2. Apply changes to the variables that the client is set to transmit. As depicted bellow, there are different values in the respective data blocks of client and server.

	Send_Data							
		Nam	e	Data type	Offset	Start value	Monitor value	
1		× 5	Static					
2		•	Var1	Bool	0.0	false	TRUE	
3	-		Var2	String	2.0		'Hello World!'	

	Received_Data						
		Na	me	Data type	Offset	Start value	Monitor value
1		•	Static				
2	-00	•	Var1	Bool	0.0	false	FALSE
3	-		Var2	String	2.0		

3. Activate the client's trigger to transmit the data.



2 Engineering

4. Verify that the new updated values are received in the "Received_Data" DB.

	Sei	nd_Data				
		Name	Data type	Offset	Start value	Monitor value
1	-	▼ Static				
2	-	Var1	Bool	0.0	false	TRUE
2	-0	Var2	String	2.0		'Hello World!'
5	0.	- L D to				
	Ree	ceived_Data				
	Ree	ceived_Data	Data type	Offset	Start value	Monitor value
1	Re	ceived_Data Name ▼ Static	Data type	Offset	Start value	Monitor value
1 2	Ree	ceived_Data Name ▼ Static ■ Var1	Data type Bool	Offset	Start value	Monitor value

Secure OUC vs Unsecured OUC

To understand the importance of encrypting and signing data, Wireshark is used to analyze the communication packages sent during transmission.

When data is transmitted via secure communication, it is encrypted and safeguarded with TLS v1.3. This ensures confidentiality of sensitive data, maintains its integrity, and authenticates the sender.

60 30.628910	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	TLSv1.3	332 Client Hello
61 30.639511	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.2	TLSv1.3	1244 Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec, Application Data, Application Data, Appli
62 30.653596	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	TLSv1.3	990 Change Cipher Spec, Application Data, Application Data, Application Data
63 30.660089	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.2	TLSv1.3	212 Application Data, Application Data
64 30.816795	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	TCP	54 63801 → 2000 [ACK] Seq=1215 Ack=1349 Win=8034 Len=0
1498 61.162622	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	TLSv1.3	334 Application Data
1513 61.270204	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.2	TCP	54 2000 → 63801 [ACK] Seq=1349 Ack=1495 Win=8192 Len=0

 02
 c0
 a8
 00
 63
 00
 02
 c0

 01
 40
 a6
 d4
 40
 40
 66

 00
 1f
 53
 97
 d6
 f6
 77

 1f
 62
 42
 7d
 40
 60
 17
 93

 ba
 c
 49
 48
 1f
 3a
 53
 55

 ba
 c
 49
 48
 1f
 3a
 53
 55

 58
 68
 a7
 17
 54
 28
 56
 56
 49
 33
 98
 c7
 44
 46
 45
 af

 50
 c
 58
 49
 33
 98
 c7
 44
 98
 38
 62
 74
 17
 59
 26
 56
 49
 33
 98
 c7
 12
 c5
 64
 98
 38
 98
 c7
 12
 c5
 64
 98
 38
 62
 Frame 1498: 334 bytes on wire (2672 bits), 334 bytes captured (2672 bits) Ethernet II, Src: 02:c0:a8:00:63:10 (02:c0:a8:00:63:10), Dst: 02:c0:a8:00 6 · @ · @ k>h0 ۰P Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.0.2, Dst: 192.168.0.1 bB} Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 63801, Dst Port: 2000, Seq: 1215, Transport Layer Security @ -6 t ٠E b K@ · : s 3 $\begin{array}{c} c \ c \ c \ 58 \ 49 \ 33 \ 98 \ c \ 74 \\ 1a \ ce \ fo \ ef \ 64 \ 9a \ 33 \ ce \ 74 \\ 1a \ ce \ fo \ ef \ 64 \ 9a \ 33 \ ce \ 74 \\ 1a \ ce \ fo \ ef \ 64 \ 9a \ 36 \ ce \ 74 \\ 1a \ ce \ fo \ 54 \ 54 \ ce \ 74 \\ 1a \ ce \ fo \ 55 \ ce \ 74 \\ 1a \ ce \ fo \ 55 \ ce \ 74 \\ 1a \ ce \ 74 \ ce \ 74 \ ce \ 74 \\ 1a \ ce \ 74 \ ce \ 74 \ ce \ 74 \\ 1a \ ce \ 74 \ ce$ XI3 .% "* 0 @g кø nU+,\$ & @I · P · r · :Vc · Kv 1 · B ٠N z ۰y ad ٠N n j E.D/ h J4…r …u\.A K-Q-D .D.[.> ٠A hf 44 80 5b cd 3e

On the other hand, unsecure OUC transmits data in plain text, leaving sensitive information vulnerable to easy access and manipulation by attackers.

659 13.691099	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	TCP	54 61260 → 2000 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0
1830 44.745785	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	TCP	54 [TCP Keep-Alive] 61260 → 2000 [ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0
1831 44.745914	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.2	TCP	54 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] 2000 → 61260 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0
4308 75.839051	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.2	TCP	54 [TCP Keep-Alive] 2000 → 61260 [ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0
4309 75.839145	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	TCP	54 [TCP Keep-Alive ACK] 61260 → 2000 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0
4361 76.065424	192.168.0.2	192.168.0.1	TCP	312 61260 → 2000 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=258
4408 76.258203	192.168.0.1	192.168.0.2	TCP	54 2000 → 61260 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=259 Win=8192 Len=0



3 Additional information – Certificate management via OPC UA

3.1 GDS Push for dynamic certificate management

3.1.1 Overview

Supported TIA Portal and firmware versions

With TIA Portal V17 and firmware version V2.9, the GDS Push functionality has been integrated into the SIMATIC S7-1500 controller for OPC UA server certificates. Additionally, as of TIA Portal version V18 and firmware version V3.0, GDS push management for web server certificates is also supported.

Description

GDS Push utilizes the certificate management services of an OPC UA server to transfer web and OPC UA server certificates during runtime, as well as trust lists and certificate revocation lists for the latter.

After the CPU has been provisioned, certificates can be managed without TIA Portal, offering enhanced flexibility and convenience for long-term maintenance. This dynamic certificate management approach eliminates any manual work required for reconfiguring the CPU, i.e. after the period of validity of a certificate has expired. Moreover, GDS Push can transfer certificates and lists with the CPU in STOP and RUN mode, enabling operators to handle certificates with minimal disruptions to production.

Certificate management from the CPU's point of view

The use of dynamic certificate handling on the CPU is divided into three phases:

- 1. CPU configuration in TIA Portal and downloading of the configuration to the CPU.
- 2. Initial provisioning of a trust list and a server certificate.
- 3. Regular updating of certificates according to the security policies of a company.



Refer to the application example titled "Dynamic certificate management with OPC UA GDS Push" for detailed instructions on how to commission a CPU with GDS Push (<u>https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/109799888</u>).

3.1.2 GDS Push certificate handling scenarios

Scenario 1 - OPC UA certificates

Certificates need to be managed dynamically with GDS Push while controllers are in running mode. Both the certificate and private key of the server are generated using a central certificate management.



Scenario 2 - OPC UA certificates

Certificates need to be managed dynamically with GDS Push while controllers are in running mode. To enhance security and stick to safety recommendations, it has been decided to use a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to guarantee that the private key of the controller never leaves the CPU.



Scenario 3 - Web server certificates

Certificates need to be managed dynamically with GDS Push while controllers are in running mode.



4 FAQ / Error Handling

4.1 Certificates

4.1.1 Is it possible to work with certificates without protecting the project?

The only available method to work with certificates in TIA Portal, without protecting the project, is by using the local certificate manager with the global security settings disabled. Nonetheless, this approach offers limited functionality and restricts certificates to being self-signed.

4.1.2 How long should a certificate be valid?

In OT environments, the recommended certificate validity is regulated by the specific needs and security practices of the organization. There are, however, some general guidelines highlighted in chapter 1.4.

4.1.3 Which changes on the device configuration will require a new certificate?

Any information of the device configuration that has been included in the certificate, such as IP addresses, will require a certificate renewal.

Certificates generated through the local certificate manager are automatically updated, when relevant configuration changes are applied, once the project is compiled. However, certificates created via the global certificate manager do not undergo automatic updates, requiring users to "Renew" them manually.

4.1.4 Which SAN fields are mandatory?

Different communication protocols may impose mandatory fields within the SAN. The table below provides a summary of the required fields for each use case.

Table 4-1

	OPC UA server and client	TLS server *
URI	Mandatory	-
IP	Optional (Mandatory with FW 2.5)	Mandatory
DNS	Optional	Optional
RID	-	-
Email	-	-
Other Name	-	-

* HTTPS, Secure OUC and PG/HMI communication.

4.1.5 What is the difference between exporting the certificate chain vs certificate?

Exporting the certificate chain involves the export of not just the certificate itself but also of all intermediary and root authorities above it. This results in an export of all public keys from the trust hierarchy, which can be interesting in certain scenarios, such as debugging and troubleshooting.

Check Table 2-3 to determine which file formats support the export of certificate chains.

4.1.6 What happens if an incomplete chain of trust is loaded into the PLC's "trusted certificate store"?

If an OPC UA client, such as UaExpert, possesses a certificate issued by an intermediate authority, which, in turn, was issued by a root CA, the server must have access to the entire trust chain in its "trusted certificate store".

If an incomplete chain of trust is loaded into the PLC's "trusted certificate store", the connection with the server will not be established.

NOTE Usually, when trusting a higher certificate—be it the root or intermediate CA—automatic trust is extended to all certificates below the one that has been trusted. However, this principle is not applied in the local certificate manager of SIMATIC CPUs.

4.1.7 Which tools can be used to create certificates without TIA Portal?

Some useful tools to create certificates are:

 OpenSSL: is an open-source software used for general-purpose cryptography and to secure communications. To configure the necessary extensions needed for OPC UA and TLS communication, configuration files can be used to summarize all certificate requitements.

The main drawback of OpenSSL is its reliance on command-line execution, resulting in a steep learning curve that can pose challenges for new users.

• XCA: built on top of OpenSSL, XCA incorporates a graphical interface that offers a userfriendly and intuitive experience for working with certificates. It is designed to handle various tasks, including creating, managing, and renewing X-509 certificates, securely storing private keys, generating revocation lists, processing certificate sign requests and more.

4.1.8 How can certificates be managed without downloading via TIA Portal?

As mentioned in section 3.1.1, GDS Push makes use of the certificate management services of an OPC UA server to transfer certificates during runtime. Additionally, trust lists and certificate revocation lists can also be updated dynamically.

A notable advantage of GDS Push is that, after provisioning the CPU, certificates can be managed without TIA Portal, offering enhanced flexibility and convenience for long-term maintenance.

4.2 OPC UA

4.2.1 Are certificates required to authenticate via username and password?

When a client session is authenticated via username and password, encryption of the password is essential to protect it from being stolen. Nonetheless, only the server's certificate is required, as the client uses the server's public key to encrypt the password.

Therefore, a client without public key (certificate) and private key can connect to an endpoint, with SecurityMode "None", employing username and password authentication.

NOTE Regardless of the SecurityMode and authentication method used, the OPC UA server always sends its certificate to the client before starting the SecureChannel.

4.2.2 What happens to the OPC UA connection if one certificate expires?

If the OPC UA connection has already been established, the communication between client and server is maintained until the SecureChannel is renewed.

4.2.3 What is the SecureChannel and how often is it renewed?

Before initiating a session, OPC UA communication partners are required to establish a SecureChannel using the Private Key Infrastructure for asymmetric signing and encryption. The SecureChannel is then used to transfer the symmetric key between client and server without the risk of it being intercepted.

To initiate a SecureChannel, the OPC UA client sends a request to the server, specifying the desired Lifetime for the SecureChannel. The server then processes this request and responds to the client by generating a SecurityToken with a designated RevisedLifetime.

```
> Message : Encodeable Object
> TypeId : ExpandedNodeId
> OpenSecureChannelResponse
> ResponseHeader: ResponseHeader
ServerProtocolVersion: 0
> SecurityToken: ChannelSecurityToken
ChannelId: 2931577472
TokenId: 1
CreatedAt: Oct 26, 2023 14:19:51.402071500
RevisedLifetime: 300000
ServerNonce: 01
```

OPC UA clients are configured to reopen the SecureChannel when 75% of the SecurityToken Lifetime has elapsed, ensuring that they will receive a new SecurityToken before the previous one expires.

- The minimum lifetime of a SecureChannel in a SIMATIC controller is 300.000 milliseconds, 5 minutes, while the maximum lifetime is set to 3.600.000 milliseconds, 1 hour. Therefore, OPC UA servers running on SIMATIC controllers have a maximum SecurityToken Lifetime of 60 minutes. Due to the 75% rule, clients renew the SecureChannel every 45 minutes.
- Other OPC UA servers have a configuration file where these minimum and maximum values can be modified. SIMATIC controllers don't have an accessible configuration file that users can modify.

<TransportQuotas>

<OperationTimeout>600000</OperationTimeout>
<MaxStringLength>1048576</MaxStringLength>
<MaxByteStringLength>1048576</MaxByteStringLength>
<MaxArrayLength>65535</MaxArrayLength>
<MaxMessageSize>4194304</MaxMessageSize>
<MaxBufferSize>65535</MaxBufferSize>
<ChannelLifetime>300000</ChannelLifetime>
<SecurityTokenLifetime>3600000</SecurityTokenLifetime>
</TransportQuotas>

4.2.4 Why is it important to renew the SecureChannel?

Renewing the SecureChannel is important for two main reasons:

- Attackers can decipher keys by analyzing encrypted messages. The more messages sent using the same key, the easier it becomes to perform "cryptanalytic attacks". Therefore, symmetric keys used in OPC UA communication should periodically be renewed to avoid this threat.
- 2. If a server/client certificate expires or its private key gets compromised, it is important to terminate ongoing communications. Applications are only able to verify their partners' certificates during the process of opening or renewing the SecureChannel. Therefore, without a predefined expiration mechanism for the SecurityToken, clients and servers would not know if their partner's certificate has expired or if it has been revoked.

NOTE

The OPC Foundation recommends shorter SecurityToken lifetimes for applications where the number of exchanged messages is expected to be high. This parameter can easily be modified in certain OPC UA client's like UaExpert.

Configure UaExpert		\times
Filter:		
Parameter	Value	^
General.PublishTimeout	60000	
General.ResetAddServerDialog	true	
General.Retrievelcons	false	
General.SecureChannelLifetime	3600000	
General.SessionTimeout	1,2e+06	
General.ShowUTCTimestamps	false	
General.SubscribeForModelChangeEvents	true	~
	OK Ca	ncel

4.2.5 What limitations exist for GDS Push?

For the OPC UA Push function, an S7-1500 CPU, regardless of the type, has a configuration limit of 62 trust list entries as of firmware version V2.9.

- Each activated certificate-based service, web server and OPC UA server, "consumes" one entry for the certificate and an entry for the private key.
- A Certificate Revocation List (CRL) counts as one entry in the list of trusted certificates.
- A certificate that is used by different services counts as a single trust list entry.

Additionally, the push function has a maximum size limit for elements, such as certificates, of 4096 bytes.

To gain deeper understanding of GDS Push, refer to chapter 11.2.7 of the Manual titled "SIMATIC S7-1500, ET 200MP, ET 200SP, ET 200AL, ET 200pro, ET 200eco PN Communication" (<u>https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/59192925</u>).

5 Appendix

5.1 Service and support

SiePortal

The integrated platform for product selection, purchasing and support - and connection of Industry Mall and Online support. The SiePortal home page replaces the previous home pages of the Industry Mall and the Online Support Portal (SIOS) and combines them.

- Products & Services In Products & Services, you can find all our offerings as previously available in Mall Catalog.
- Support

In Support, you can find all information helpful for resolving technical issues with our products.

• mySieportal

mySiePortal collects all your personal data and processes, from your account to current orders, service requests and more. You can only see the full range of functions here after you have logged in.

You can access SiePortal via this address: sieportal.siemens.com

Technical Support

The Technical Support of Siemens Industry provides you fast and competent support regarding all technical queries with numerous tailor-made offers – ranging from basic support to individual support contracts.

Please send queries to Technical Support via Web form: <u>support.industry.siemens.com/cs/my/src</u>

SITRAIN – Digital Industry Academy

We support you with our globally available training courses for industry with practical experience, innovative learning methods and a concept that's tailored to the customer's specific needs.

For more information on our offered trainings and courses, as well as their locations and dates, refer to our web page:

siemens.com/sitrain

Industry Online Support app

You will receive optimum support wherever you are with the "Industry Online Support" app. The app is available for iOS and Android:





5.2 Links and literature

No. Topic

\1\	Siemens Industry Online Support https://support.industry.siemens.com
\2\	Link to this entry page of this application example https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109769068

\3\

5.3 Change documentation

Version	Date	Modification
V1.0	09/2019	First version
V2.0	03/2024	Complete rework