Using Certificates with TIA Portal

SIMATIC / TIA Portal

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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This document addresses the key aspects of certificate management in OT environments, a topic gaining special significance as industries shift to the digital era. In this new industrial landscape, OT systems face the same challenges and risks as the IT domain, underscoring the need to secure communications and ensure proper understanding and utilization of certificates.

Therefore, this application example provides guidelines to establish secure communications in the context of OPC UA, OUC (Open User Communication) and HTTPS, offering an overview of the tools and possibilities available within TIA Portal.

1.2 Public Key Infrastructure

Integrity, confidentiality, and endpoint authentication

The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) stands as a robust framework in the field of cybersecurity, safeguarding digital communications by ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of messages transmitted over networks, as well as providing endpoint authentication.

- Integrity: Data must remain unchanged and unaltered during transmission.
- Confidentiality: Sensitive information must be kept private and inaccessible to unauthorized parties.
- Authentication: The communication partner is who it claims to be and the party who is to be reached.

Basic principles

To grasp how the Public Key Infrastructure manages to secure communications, it is necessary to understand signing and encryption.

- Encryption is the process of transforming plain text into ciphertext, making it solely understandable to authorized users. By employing an "encryption key", a unique cipher is generated, effectively locking the message. Only entities possessing the correct key can decrypt and unlock this data, guaranteeing its confidentiality.

  There are two main types of encryptions: symmetric and asymmetric encryption.

  1. Symmetric encryption employs a single key for both encryption and decryption of the cipher, rendering it an efficient, simple, and high-performance procedure. The main challenge of this approach lies in securely distributing the shared key between the sender and the receiver, without it being intercepted by unauthorized parties.
  2. On the other hand, asymmetric encryption involves a pair of keys: a private key and a public key. Data encrypted with one key can only be decrypted with the other. While the public key is shared openly, the private key must always remain secret.

     Each communication partner has its own private and public keys, solving the key distribution problem present in symmetric cryptography. Nonetheless, it is computationally intensive and therefore not suitable for large data transfers.

  To tackle the disadvantages associated with each individual encryption method, the PKI adopts a hybrid approach. Initially, communication partners employ asymmetric encryption to establish a secure channel, facilitating the exchange of a symmetric key between them. Once the shared key has been exchanged, communication transitions to symmetric encryption that can handle extensive sets of data.
- Digital signing is used to verify authenticity and integrity. The sender passes the message through a hashing algorithm, generating a unique code known as “hash”. This code is encrypted with the sender’s private key, forming a digital signature. Both the signature and the original message are transmitted.

Upon receiving the message, the recipient uses the sender's public key to decrypt the signature and extract the original hash. Then, the receiver performs the hashing process with the received message and compares it with the original. If both hashes match, the integrity and authenticity of the message can be confirmed.

Course of the secure communication

The figure below shows, in simplified terms, how communication is established ("handshake") focusing on the negotiation of keys used for data exchange. This process can be generalized to all communication options that are based on the usage of TLS, i.e., Secure Open User Communication.



Key components of the PKI

The Public Key Infrastructure main components are:

- Public and private keys, to perform the initial asymmetric encryption.
- Digital certificates, which serve as electronic credentials that bind public keys to the identity of the certificate holder.
- Certificate Authorities (CAs), used to validate the identity of certificate holders and issue new certificates.
- Servers, often referred to as subjects, are network entities that need to prove their identity.
- Clients, or relying parties, must trust servers to establish a secure connection with them.

NOTE In certain protocols, such as HTTPS, clients only validate the server's identity. In contrast, some industrial protocols such as OPC UA require mutual authentication, establishing a two-way trust relationship between clients and servers.

NOTE Clients and servers can be configured to allow connections from any communication partner without requiring authentication. It is essential, however, to restrict this configuration to the testing or commissioning stages. Transitioning to a production environment mandates special emphasis on security. Thus, access must be limited to authorized entities and communication safeguarded through signing and encryption.

1.3 Digital certificates

Certificate basics

A certificate is a digital/electronic credential used to assert the online identities of individuals, computers, and other entities on a network. They are similar to ID cards, and they bind the identity of the owner with a public key.

X-509 is one of the most common standards used to define the format of certificates. To ensure the authenticity of the entities and enable signing and encryption, these certificates include the following fields:

- Public key.
- Serial number of the certificate.
- Version number of the certificate.
- Validity period (starting and expiring dates).
- Owner (certificate subject).
- Issuer (CA or self-signed).
- Supported encryption and signing algorithms.
- Extensions – Subject Alternative Name (since X-509 Version 3)

NOTE Certificates do not contain the private key of the subject, as it must be kept secret.

Certificate types

Different types of certificates can be found depending on the entity of the issuer, as they can be generated by their own (self-signed) or issued by a Certificate Authority (CA).

- **Self-signed certificates:** Each device creates its own certificate; therefore, they are both certificate holder and issuer. To establish trust relations between devices, it is necessary to import all partner certificates.
- **Certificates issued by a Certificate Authority (CA):** Device certificates are signed by a Certificate Authority. Therefore, if the CA is trusted, all communication devices whose certificates are issued by this CA are instantly trusted and thus authorized to establish a connection.

  To invalidate certificates that are no longer deemed valid or trusted, Certificate Authorities employ Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL).

Decision making for different scenarios

- **Self-signed approach:** It can be useful in small and static systems where the number of devices is low. However, given that devices have a maximum limit of keys that can be stored (64 in the case of SIMATIC PLCs), this approach can lead to resource bottlenecks.

  Additionally, introducing new devices to the system can be challenging, as new certificates must be distributed to all communication partners. Therefore, industrial systems with these certificates can be difficult to maintain (renew certificates) and expand.
- **Issued by Certificate Authorities:** This second approach offers more flexibility when managing medium to big systems, and it consumes less storage resources, as only CA certificates need to be loaded to the CPUs.

  The primary drawback of this approach is the need for a centralized administrative instance equipped with security measures for private keys. However, this concern can be effectively addressed using TIA's Certificate Manager.

1.4 Certificate Management

Key Handling

Proper handling of certificates is critical to maintain integrity, confidentiality, and availability within industrial systems. As highlighted earlier, in the Public Key Infrastructure, entities make use of both a public and a private key to establish secure communications. Therefore, understanding the distinctions between these keys and how they must be handled is of utmost importance.

Public Key: The public key is intentionally created for widespread use, and it can be shared freely to any entity without compromising the security of the system. Its responsibilities include:

- Encryption of messages: to ensure that only the owner of the matching private key can decrypt and access the information.
- Verification of digital signatures: providing assurance that a message is indeed originated from the rightful owner of the private key.

Private Key: On the other hand, the private key is strictly confidential and must be kept secret. Its roles include:

- Decryption of messages: that are sent and encrypted by communication partners, using the corresponding public key.
- Signing: so other devices can verify the authenticity and integrity of messages.

Consequently, protection of private keys is imperative to prevent unauthorized access, decryption, and forging of digital signatures. Sections 2.4.6 and 2.5.5 include diagrams to showcase how certificates and private keys must be handled in different scenarios.

Certificate renewal

In Operational Technology (OT), the recommended certificate validity is regulated by the specific needs and security practices of the organization. There are, however, some general guidelines.

1. **Shorter validity periods:** Due to the criticality of industrial systems and the ever-evolving security threats, certificates in OT environments often have shorter validity periods compared to traditional IT systems. This typical validity might range from a few months to a few years.
2. **Regular renewal:** Renewing certificates regularly helps to maintain a higher level of security by ensuring that older certificates, which might become compromised or less secure over time due to newly emerging technologies, are replaced with newer ones.
3. **Balance security and operational impact:** While shorter validity periods enhance security, frequent certificate changes could potentially impact operational continuity. Therefore, it is essential to find a balance between security needs and operational impact.

   Refer to chapter 3.1, “GDS Push for dynamic certificate management”, to gain insights on how to handle certificates with minimal disruptions to production.
4. **Compliance to industry standards:** Some industries or regulatory frameworks might require specific conditions regarding certificate validity periods.

Thus, OT environments tend to follow a more conservative approach than some IT environments when it comes to certificate validity. This stems from the critical nature of industrial control systems and the need to mitigate risks associated with cyber threats while considering the continuous operation of these systems.

1.5 Components used

This application example consists of the following components:

Component	Article number	Note
TIA Portal V19	6ES7822-1AA23-0YA5	-
CPU 1516F-3 PN/PD	6ES7516-3FP03-0AB0	FW 3.1 – With previous firmware versions, step-by-step procedures can differ from those outlined in this document.
CPU 1516-3 PN/PD	6ES7516-3AP03-0AB0	FW 3.1

2 Engineering

2.1 Hardware setup

A PG with TIA Portal V19 is used to create and manage certificates, as well as configuring the S7-1500 CPU. The CPU will run an OPC UA server, a Web server, and a TLS server for Secure OUC. To test these protocols, UaExpert operates as the OPC UA client, Edge functions as the web browser for connecting to the web server, and a second PLC runs the TLS client.



2.2 Planning

This application example is structured into distinct sections, each focusing on a specific topic. It starts with an assessment on how to manage certificates within TIA Portal, offering a comprehensive overview of the possibilities that TIA Portal currently offers. Following this point, the document provides guidelines and examples on how to handle certificates for each communication protocol. Finally, a brief introduction to dynamic management of certificates via GDS Push is carried out.

2.3 TIA Portal for certificate management

2.3.1 Overview

Certificate management options in TIA Portal

Since TIA Portal version V14 and CPU firmware version V2.0, certificate management for S7-1500 CPUs has been available. The table below outlines all certificate management options based on the service used, TIA Portal version, and firmware version of S7-1500 PLCs.

Service	Certificate management with TIA Portal (TIA Portal version / S7-1500 CPU FW-version)	Certificate management with OPC UA GDS push methods (TIA Portal version / S7-1500 CPU FW-version)
Web server	as of V14 / as of V2.0	as of V18 / as of V3.0
Secure OUC	as of V14 / as of V2.0	-
OPC UA server	as of V14 / as of V2.0	as of V17 / as of V2.9
OPC UA client	as of V15.1 / as of V2.6	-
Secure PG/HMI communication	as of V17 / as of V2.9	-
Syslog client	as of V19 / as of V3.1	-

Additionally, as of firmware version V4.4, S7-1200 CPUs also support secure communication.

Local and global certificate managers

TIA Portal offers different options to manage certificates via the local and global certificate managers.

- Local certificate manager: Each device has its own local certificate manager, where certificates are generated and managed for each individual device. These certificates can be used for the OPC UA server and Web server running on the device, as well as for additional system features that require certificates, such as Secure OUC.
- Global certificate manager: Contains an overview of all the certificates used in a project, including Certification Authorities, certificates issued by CAs, and self-signed certificates.

NOTE Certificates must always be included in the local certificate manager of a device to be part of the HW configuration. Referencing the certificate's ID in the global certificate manager is not sufficient to assign the certificate to a device.

Global security settings

Devices in TIA Portal can be configured to operate exclusively with the local certificate manager or utilize both the local and global certificate managers through the global security settings.

If the global security settings are disabled in a device, it will only have access to the CPU-specific certificate manager. Consequently, its functionality will be limited, as it won't have access to root CAs or other certificates imported into the project.

Activating the global security settings allows the local certificate manager to access the global certificate manager and vice versa. Thus, the device is granted access to the certificate store of the project and to additional functionalities covered in section 2.3.3.

NOTE To access the global certificate manager, the project must be protected, and the user must be logged in as administrator.

2.3.2 Using the local certificate manager

Access to the local certificate manager

The local certificate manager is located within each device.

1. To access the local CPU-specific certificate manager, select the CPU in the project tree and navigate to the “Properties” tab.



2. Select “Protection & Security > Certificate Manager > Certificate Management with TIA Portal”. If a device supports “secure PG/PC and HMI communication”, a certificate is automatically generated to enable this type of communication.



Note: Due to the limited functionality in the local certificate manager, certificates can only be created, exported (without the private key) or deleted.



Creating new certificates

New certificates can be created in various ways within the local certificate manager.

1. To add new certificates, click on “<Add new>” and “Create”. Enter all certificate parameters in the corresponding input fields. As highlighted in the snapshot, certificates can only be self-signed, as the local certificate manager has no access to Certification Authorities.



2. In addition, certificates are automatically added into the CPU during the activation of both the web and OPC UA servers. Full detailed instructions on how to configure these servers is provided in sections 2.4.3 and 2.5.2.



NOTE

When the global security settings are activated, the contents of the local certificate manager are deleted, and the private keys cannot be restored.

2.3.3 Using the global certificate manager

Description

To access the global certificate manager the project must be protected from unauthorized access, which is done from the project's "Security settings".

In TIA Portal version V14, these settings become visible only after activating the global security settings on at least one device. Since TIA Portal version V15, such activation is no longer required, and the project's security settings are always visible.

Access to the security settings of the project (only for TIA Portal version V14)

To access the security settings of a project in TIA Portal V14, these steps must be followed:

1. Select a CPU in the project tree and navigate to the "Properties" tab.



2. Select "Protection & Security > Certificate Manager > Certificate management with TIA Portal". Activate the function "Use global security settings for certificate manager".



3. Confirm the following message with the "OK" button.

As a result, the security settings of the project become visible.



NOTE

Enabling the global security settings deletes the contents of the local certificate manager. Therefore, if any secure communications are being used, such as “Secure PG/PC and HMI Communication”, HTTPS, Secure OUC or OPC UA, new certificates need to be created.

Access to the global certificate manager

To access the global certificate manager, the project must be protected from unauthorized access. To create a project administrator:

1. Double-click on the entry "Settings" in the project tree under "Security settings". Click the "Protect this project" button.



2. Define a username and password. Confirm the password and click on "OK".



The “Certificate manager” will appear under the project’s “Security settings > Security features”.



NOTE

Following this step, the project can only be opened after logging in with admin credentials.

Default Certification Authorities

By default, two root certificates (Certification Authorities) are provided in each project:

- The first root certificate with ID=1 employs SHA1 as the hashing algorithm.
- The second Certification Authority with ID=2 is based on SHA-256.



NOTE

SHA1 is deprecated and it is no longer considered secure, therefore the first CA should only be used in legacy systems that do not support SHA-256.

Certificate fields in the global certificate manager

Some of the most relevant fields shown in the global certificate manager are:

Field	Description
ID	Every certificate in the certificate manager receives a unique ID that cannot be changed. The certificate ID is assigned by the certificate manager when a certificate is created or imported.
Common name of subject	Device or certificate authority for which the certificate is valid.
Serial number	Unique serial number of the certificate.
Issuer	Shows the name, organization, and country of the certificate issuer.
Valid to	Indicates when the certificate expires.
Used as	Indicates for which application or service the certificate is used, e.g., as SSL certificate or certificate authority.
Private key	Indicates whether the private key exists in the project.
Signature algorithm	Indicates the cipher of the private key as well as the hash algorithm used.
Key length	Shows the key length of the certificate.

Functions of the global certificate manager

The global certificate manager contains an overview of all the certificates used in the project, and, in contrast to the local certificate manager, incorporates a wide variety of options to manage certificates, such as:

1. Import new certificates and certificate authorities.
2. Export certificates and certificate authorities used in the project.
3. Renewal of expired certificates and certificate authorities.
4. Replacement of existing certificates.
5. Adding trusted certificates and certification authorities.
6. Deleting manually imported certificates.

Exporting certificates

Certificates and private keys can be exported in various formats. Depending on the format, the following options are available during export.

Available for selection during export	Format						Note
	.cer	.der	.crt	.pem	.crl	.p12	
Private key	x	x	x	x	-	x	For *.cer and *.der, an additional key file is exported for the certificate. The exported key file cannot be imported again. For *.crt and *.pem, the private key is stored together with the certificate in a file.
Encrypted private key	-	-	x	x	-	-	Selection of the encryption method and input of password possible. If no password is entered, the project name is used as the password.
Certificate chain	-	-	x	x	-	-	Only possible if the certificates of the certificate chain are stored in the certificate manager.
Password only	-	-	-	-	-	x	If no password is entered, the project name is used as password.
Revocation list	-	-	-	-	x	-	Certain programs, such as UaExpert, require revocation lists to establish trust relationships with root CAs. TIA Portal can only export empty revocation lists.

Creating and renewing certificates

Establishing new secure communication channels involves the creation of digital certificates. Once created, long-term maintenance is achieved through the renewal of these certificates, allowing users to update the validity period of expired certificates or adjust the encryption and hashing algorithms if they become deprecated.

The creation and renewal of certificates is done through the pop-up window depicted below. To configure new certificates, the following steps must be carried out.

1. Specify the intended purpose of the certificate by choosing a predefined template. Depending on the intended use, specific "KeyUsage" and "ExtendedKeyUsage" extensions will be incorporated into the certificate.
2. Select the issuer of the new certificate: self-signed or signed by a Certificate Authority.
3. If the certificate is issued by a Certificate Authority, select it with the "Select" button. Only certification authorities from the certificate store of the current project, equipped with a private key, can be selected.
4. Depending on the certificate, enter the following parameters in the corresponding input fields:
   - Common name of subject: name associated with the certificate holder.
   - Encryption method: cipher algorithm used to perform asymmetric encryption.
   - Key length: Depends on the cipher. For RSA, it represents the key length in bits, while for EC, it corresponds to the ECC curve (e.g., prime256v1, secp256r1, secp384r1).
   - Hash algorithm: algorithm used for signing the certificate.
   - Valid from/until: validity period of the certificate.
   - Subject alternative name (SAN): additional host names, IP addresses, email addresses, and other identifiers associated with the certificate subject beyond the common name.



NOTE

When certificates are created from the global certificate manager, a blank canvas is provided. In contrast, generating certificates directly from the CPU offers templates that streamline the creation process.

Creating a certificate from the CPU does not restrict the certificate to the local certificate manager of the device. With the global security settings activated, these certificates can also be accessed and managed through the global certificate manager.

Replacing certificates

The process of replacing certificates enables the substitution of an existing certificate with a new .p12 certificate while preserving its unique ID within the global certificate manager. The benefits of replacing certificates instead of importing or creating new ones is explained in section 2.3.4.



Assigning certificates

When integrating other devices, such as communication processors (CPs), certificates need to be assigned through the global certificate manager. The dialog "Assign certificate with ID x to device" provides the mechanism to transfer certificates to these processors.

As shown in the manual (https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/103948898) of the CP 1243-1, to assign trusted partner certificates to the CP via the global certificate manager:

1. Right-click on the desired certificate.
2. Select "Assign" in the shortcut menu.
3. Mark the device/module in the subsequent dialog.
4. Define how the certificate is to be assigned in the "Used as" field:
   - Device certificate (not specified): e.g., for Secure OUC or blocks.
   - Device certificate: Web server certificate.
   - Trusted certificate: e.g., OPC UA.



Only one certificate per device can be used as a “Device certificate”. Once assigned, the certificate appears in the "Certificates of the partner devices" table in the local certificate manager of the module.

2.3.4 Loading certificates to the CPU during runtime

Downloading certificates to the CPU is part of the hardware configuration. Traditionally, applying changes to the hardware configuration requires the CPU to be in STOP mode, which, in turn, halts production processes. However, with TIA V19 and FW 3.1, new certificates can be loaded to the CPU during runtime.

To do so, new certificates need to have the same certificate ID in the global certificate manager as the ones already loaded on the device. The only available means to generate new certificates with matching IDs are the "Renew" and "Replace” methods.



NOTE

To upload certificates, users must be logged in with an admin account. Newly created admin users need to sign out and log in again to be able to load certificates during runtime.

2.4 Certificates in the scope of OPC UA communication

2.4.1 Overview on OPC UA communication

Description

OPC UA communication in S7-1200/S7-1500 CPUs follows a client-server approach. In this model, servers provide services such as read, write, browse, subscribe, and more, enabling clients to access data stored in their AddressSpace.

For a secure connection to be established, the client must validate and accept the digital certificate presented by the server, deeming it trustworthy. Simultaneously, the server is required to verify the certificate provided by the client, ensuring mutual authentication.

Once the secure connection is established via the Public Key Infrastructure, a shared key is transmitted, and communication transitions to symmetric encryption.

OPC UA certificates

OPC UA certificates adhere to the format specified by X-509 Version 3 of the ITU (International Telecommunication Union) for the authentication of client and server.

When a connection is being established between both entities, the devices check all information from the certificate that is required to determine its integrity, such as signature, period of validity, application name (URI) and, in case of firmware version V2.5 (S7-1500 CPU), also the IP address of the client.

2.4.2 Security settings for the OPC UA server

Security policies and security modes

Server endpoints can be configured with different “SecurityModes” and “SecurityPolicies”.

SecurityMode	Description
None	No security is applied, and communication is in plaintext.
Sign	Sign security mode ensures message integrity by adding a digital signature to each message. The signature is generated using the private key of the sender and can be verified using the sender's public key. This ensures that the message has not been tampered with during transmission.
Sign & Encrypt	Sign&Encrypt security mode provides both message integrity and confidentiality. In addition to generating a digital signature, this mode encrypts the message to prevent unauthorized access or reading of the message content. The encryption is performed using a shared secret key that is negotiated between the sender and receiver during the communication process.

SecurityPolicy	Description
None	No security is applied, and communication is in plaintext.
Basic128Rsa15 (deprecated)	128-bit encryption keys and RSA 15 encryption algorithm.
Basic256 (deprecated)	256-bit encryption keys and AES encryption algorithm.
Basic256Sha256	256-bit encryption keys and SHA-256 hashing algorithm.
Aes128Sha256RsaOaep	Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128-bit key size and SHA-256 hashing algorithm, and RSA with Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) for key exchange.
Aes256Sha256RsaPss	AES with 256-bit key size and SHA-256 hashing algorithm for message integrity, and RSA with Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) for key exchange.

User authentication

In addition to transport layer security, OPC UA can use application-based security to control access to the server, known as authentication. This mechanism is performed each time a new session is activated.

During this process, the client is given a “userIdentityToken”, which allows the server to determine if the token is authorized to establish a connection. This introduces an additional layer of security, as not only the client certificate needs to be trusted, but also a valid token must be provided for user authentication.

There are several types of user authentication methods in OPC UA, including:

Token	Description
Anonymous	Clients can connect to the server without providing any user identity.
Username and password	Clients provide a username and password, which are authenticated by the server.
X-509 Certificate	Clients provide a digital certificate that is validated by the server.

NOTE Since S7-1200/S7-1500 CPUs do not support user authentication through X-509 certificates, no additional information will be provided in this document.

2.4.3 Setting up the OPC UA server

Commissioning an OPC UA server

For security reasons, the OPC UA server is not enabled by default. To activate the server of the CPU, proceed as follows:

1. Select the CPU in the project tree and navigate to the “Properties” tab.



2. Navigate to the entry "OPC UA > Server". Activate the server and confirm the security message.



3. In “OPC UA > Server > Security > Secure channel”, select the server endpoints that will be available for OPC UA clients (security policies and modes).



4. By default, a server certificate is automatically generated in the local certificate manager of the device. As can be seen here, the certificate shown below is issued by TIA's Certification Authority (ID=2).



5. Beneath the server's certificate is the store for trusted OPC UA clients. To restrict connections exclusively to trusted clients, the "Automatically accept client certificates during runtime" checkbox must be disabled.



6. Select the area "Runtime licenses" in the CPU properties and set the purchased runtime license for the OPC UA server in the selection list "Type of purchased license".



User authentication

CPUs with firmware version 3.1 do not provide the option to manage user access directly from the CPU settings. To create a new user with "OPC UA server access":

1. Double click on “Security settings > Users and roles” and open the “Roles” tab. Click on “<Add new role>”.



2. Create a new role for an OPC UA user. Select “OPC UA server access” from the “Runtime rights” of the target CPU.



3. “Add a new local user” and assign it a username and password. Select the role with OPC UA server access.



NOTE

While not advisable, it is possible to implement anonymous user authentication by activating the default "Anonymous" user and assigning it the recently created "opcua user" role.

View the server certificate

In section 2.3.3, the CPU was set up with the global security settings. As a result, the server’s certificate can be managed through the global certificate manager, where it can be found under the “Certificate authority (CA)” and "Device certificates" tabs.





Create a new server certificate

If the server certificate was deleted due to the activation of the global security settings, proceed as follows to generate a new certificate for the server:

1. Select the entry "OPC UA > Server > Security > Certificates" in the navigation area.
2. To generate a new server certificate or substitute it with an existing one, click on the button integrated in the "Server certificate" drop-down list.

3. A dialog appears with all available server certificates. To create a new certificate, click on the "Create" button.



4. The dialog "Create certificate" appears. Automatically, the certificate is assigned with the necessary Subject Alternativ Name (SAN) fields.



5. If the new certificate is issued by a Certificate Authority, the CA’s certificate must be transferred to the “trusted device certificates” within the CPU's local certificate manager. This is done automatically when the project is compiled.



2.4.4 Setting up the OPC UA client

Description

In this application example, UaExpert is used as an OPC UA client. Developed by Unified Automation, UaExpert is an easy-to-use, out-of-the-box software application that acts as a client and allows users to access and test connections with OPC UA servers.

Creation of the client's certificate

By default, UaExpert generates its own self-signed certificate. To ensure a secure connection with the OPC UA server, it is necessary to import this certificate into the local certificate manager of the CPU, designating it as a trusted device certificate.

However, to take advantage of the trust chain associated with Certificate Authorities, a new certificate for UaExpert will be generated using the default CA from TIA's certificate manager (ID=2), thereby granting it direct trust and access.

To create the client's certificate:

1. Open the global certificate manager. Right-click on an empty row and select "Create" from the context menu.



2. In the "Create certificate" window, insert all fields needed to generate the certificate. The Subject Alternative Names for this certificate are:
   - URI: *urn:[PC_Hostname]:UnifiedAutomation:UaExpert*
   - IP: *[IP Address of the client]*
   - DNS: *[PC_Hostname]*

NOTE

To establish a secure connection with OPC UA servers running on SIMATIC PLCs, client certificates only require the URI field. For PLCs operating on FW version 2.5, the IP is also mandatory.

While some fields are optional, it is advisable to include them all, as other communication partners may consider them compulsory.



3. Upon generating the client's certificate, export it in .der format with the name "uaexpert.der," excluding the private key from the export.





4. To sign and decrypt messages, the client also requires the matching private key. Repeat the steps to export the private key in .pem format. Save the key without encryption and rename it as “uaexpert_key.pem” to ensure that UaExpert can read it.



5. Navigate to the "Settings" tab in UaExpert and select "Manage certificates…". A pop-up window appears, presenting UaExpert's self-signed certificate, along with trusted certificates, trusted issuers/CAs, and more.



6. Navigate to the “own > certs” folder and copy the newly created certificate. Repeat the process with the private key in the folder “own > private”.



NOTE

Private keys must always remain secret. They should only be exported if necessary and protected with a password.

Import the CA to UaExpert

Finally, to establish a trust relationship with the CA, and all certificates issued by it, import the root certificate into UaExpert as a trusted partner.

1. Open the global certificate manager. Export the Certification Authority with ID=2 as a .der file. Do not include the private key in the export.



2. Export the revocation list of the CA.



3. Navigate to the “trusted > certs” folder and copy the root certificate. Repeat the process with the revocation list in the folder “trusted > crl”.



2.4.5 Testing a secure OPC UA connection

After configuring the OPC UA server and client, follow these steps to establish a connection between UaExpert and the CPU.

1. Click the "Add Server" button and then double-click on "<Double click to Add Server…>". A dialog will appear to input the OPC UA server's URL running on the CPU.



2. The server endpoints will be displayed under the “Custom Discovery” section. Double-click on the endpoint with the security modes and policies configured earlier. This will add the server to the project.



3. Select the OPC UA server and click on the “Connect server” button. Insert the username and password to perform the user authentication.



As a result, the OPC UA client establishes a connection with the server, enabling secure access to the information stored within its AddressSpace.



2.4.6 OPC UA certificate handling scenarios–where does each certificate belong?

Description

This chapter concludes with a set of diagrams designed to highlight the correct handling of certificates and private keys in diverse OPC UA communication scenarios. These illustrations should be used as a guide to understand when and where certificates, private keys, and revocation lists should be exported.

Scenario 1

Using the default Certification Authorities in the global certificate manager to issue certificates for servers (CPU) and clients (external application).





Scenario 2

Using an external Certificate Authority managed within TIA Portal's Certificate Manager.



Scenario 3

Using a central certificate manager to issue and manage certificates for clients and servers. The Certificate Authority can belong to the user/company or to a third-party corporation such as DigiCert or RapidSSL among many others.



2.5 Certificates in the scope of HTTPS web server communication

2.5.1 Overview on HTTPS communication

Description

The foundation of HTTPS security lies in the TLS protocol, requiring the presence of certificates on those devices running web servers. To prevent unsecure connections with web servers, CPUs must be configured to exclusively allow access through HTTPS.

In contrast to OPC UA, which mandates mutual authentication and trust, HTTPS places the trust burden solely on the client, which must verify the validity of the web server's certificate.

NOTE Self-signed certificates lack trustworthiness in web browsers. This is because web browsers operate on a trust model that relies on Certificate Authorities. Therefore, web server certificates must be issued by recognized CAs whose certificates are trusted within the web browser settings.

HTTPS certificates

In the context of web servers, X-509 version 3 certificates are commonly used to secure communication over HTTPS. These certificates are issued by Certificate Authorities and provide the trusted means to establish the identity of the server to the client, using asymmetric cryptography before transitioning to symmetric encryption.

2.5.2 Setting up the web server

Commissioning of the web server

To configure the web server using HTTPS, the next steps must be followed:

1. Select the CPU in the project tree and navigate to the "Properties" tab.



2. In the navigation area of the "Properties" tab, select the "Web Server" entry. Activate the option "Activate web server on this module" and the option "Permit access only with HTTPS". Confirm the security message.





3. By default, a server certificate is automatically generated in the local certificate manager of the device. As can be seen here, the certificate is issued by a new Certification Authority with ID=3.



The web server's certificate can be found in the global certificate manager, under the "Certificate authority (CA)" and "Device certificates" tabs. In this case, the root certificate with ID=3 has issued the web server certificate as well as the secure PG-HMI communication.



ID	Common name of subject	Serial nu...	Issuer	Valid to	Used as	Pri..	Signat..	Key length
1	Siemens TIA Project - Appli...	0D51425...	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App...	Saturday, January 10...	Certification authorit...	Yes	RSA-S...	2048 Bit
2	Siemens TIA Project - Appli...	73AE492...	CN = Siemens TIA Project - App...	Saturday, January 10...	Certification authorit...	Yes	RSA-S...	2048 Bit
3	Siemens TIA Project- Applic...	7CBD92D...	CN = Siemens TIA Project- Appl...	Thursday, January 15...	Certification authorit...	Yes	ecdsa...	256 Bit
4	PLC-1/Communication-4	7E4BA2C...	CN = Siemens TIA Project- Appl...	Friday, January 16, 2...	Not assigned	Yes	ecdsa...	256 Bit
8	PLC-1/Webserver-8	3434F8A...	CN = Siemens TIA Project- Appl...	Friday, January 16, 2...	Not assigned	Yes	ecdsa...	256 Bit

User authentication

Like OPC UA, web server access can be controlled through user authentication. To create a new user with "Web server" access rights:

1. Double click on “Security settings > Users and roles” and navigate to the “Roles” tab. Click on “<Add new role>”. From the “Runtime rights” of the target CPU, assign those web server rights strictly required by the user.



2. Assign the new role to a user. Compile and download the project to the CPU.



2.5.3 Setting up the web browser

Description

In this Application Example, Microsoft Edge has been selected as the browser to establish the connection with the web server.

Configuration

For Microsoft Edge to trust the web server's certificate, it needs to establish a trust relationship with the CA. For this, it is necessary to export the root certificate from TIA Portal and import it into Windows' certificate store.

1. To export the root certificate from the global certificate manager, right-click on the CA and select the "Show" option. Once the certificate is opened, click on "Install Certificate…".



2. The wizard is started. Follow the instructions of the installation wizard.
   - Select the "Local Machine" as the storage location.
   - The wizard issues a security warning, which must be acknowledged with "Yes".
   - Store the certificate in the "Trusted Root Certification Authorities" folder.

   The "Finish" button imports the certificate into the selected folder.



2.5.4 Testing a secure HTTPS connection

With the CPU running and the root certificate imported into Windows' certificate store, establish a connection to the web server using the following URL: https://[CPU IP Address].

As shown in the image below, the connection is secured by TLS, and the web server's certificate is considered trustworthy.



To test the user authentication, press the "ENTER" button. As observed, anonymous users have limited access to the information displayed on the web server.



After logging in with username and password, the web server checks the user's rights and grants it access to further features.



2.5.5 HTTPS certificate handling scenarios–where does each certificate belong?

Description

The chapter concludes with a set of diagrams designed to highlight the correct handling of certificates and private keys in diverse HTTPS communication scenarios. These diagrams do not include any client certificates in the web browser, as HTTPS does not often require them for client authentication.

Scenario 1

Using TIA Portal's default CAs in the Certificate Manager to issue certificates for web servers.



Scenario 2

Using an external Certificate Authority managed within TIA's Certificate Manager.



Scenario 3

Using a central certificate manager to issue and manage certificates for the web server. The Certificate Authority can belong to the user/company or to a third-party corporation such as DigiCert or RapidSSL among many others.



2.6 Certificates in the scope of Secure OUC communication

2.6.1 Overview on Open User Communication

Description

Open User Communication is an open standard that enables communication between SIMATIC CPUs as well as with suitable third-party devices. It supports various communication protocols, some of which can be secured through TLS v1.2 and v1.3.

Transport protocol	Via interface
TCP	PROFINET/IE
ISO-on-TCP	PROFINET/IE
ISO	Industrial Ethernet (only CP 1543-1)
UDP	PROFINET/IE
FDL	PROFIBUS

Application protocol	Used transport protocol
Modbus TCP	TCP
E-Mail	TCP
FTP	TCP

The application example titled “Basic Examples for Open User Communication (OUC)” provides in-depth details on establishing non-secure OUC, focusing on ISO-on-TCP, TCP and UDP communication protocols. (https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/109747710)

OUC certificates

Secure OUC employs X-509 v3 certificates with key usage and subject alternative names that comply with TLS requirements. In this configuration, one device functions as a server and opens a designated port to establish the TCP connection, while a second device, the TLS client, initiates and establishes the connection with the server through this port.

Like web servers, only the client side is required to trust the server’s certificate. However, users can modify this setting, making it mandatory to establish a mutual trust relationship between server and client.

2.6.2 Setting up the TLS server

Description

In this application example, the CPU will be used as a TLS server. To communicate with it, a second PLC will be configured as a TLS client.

To implement the Secure Open User Communication, the function blocks "TRCV_C" and "TSEND_C" will be utilized in the Main Organization Block (OB) of both the server and client. These blocks combine the functionalities of TCON (connect), TRCV (receive) / TSEND (send), and TDISCON (disconnect) into a single, integrated block.

Creation of the server's certificate

To set up a TLS server in the CPU, the first step is to create a new TLS client/server certificate:

1. Select the CPU in the project tree and navigate to the "Properties" tab.



2. Navigate to the entry "Protection & Security > Certificate manager > Certificate management with TIA Portal" and create a new certificate in the "Device certificates" section.



3. Select the usage “TLS Client/Server” and choose a Certification Authority to issue the certificate. The Subject Alternative Names (SANs) are automatically generated.



Program the OUC communication block

Once the certificate is created, open the “Main” OB of the CPU.

1. In the “Instructions” tab, open the folder “Communication > Open user communication” and drag-and-drop the “TRCV_C” function block to the main program.



This function block requires three main input parameters:

- EN_R (Enable receive): indicates if the server is ready to receive data.
- CONNECT: variable with all necessary connection parameters.
- DATA: variables that will be overwritten with the data being sent by the client.

2. To set up the variable with the necessary connection parameters, create a new data block in the project and add a “TCON_IP_V4_SEC” variable. Set up this variable as shown in the image below.





Server_Connection_Parameters

	Name	Data type	Start value
1	Static		
2	Server IP_V4_ConnectionSEC	TCON_IP_V4_SEC	
3	ConnPara	TCON_IP_v4	
4	InterfaceId	HW_ANY	64
5	ID	CONN_OUC	1
6	ConnectionType	Byte	11
7	ActiveEstablished	Bool	false
8	RemoteAddress	IP_V4	
9	ADDR	Array[1..4] of Byte	
10	ADDR[1]	Byte	192
11	ADDR[2]	Byte	168
12	ADDR[3]	Byte	0
13	ADDR[4]	Byte	2
14	RemotePort	UInt	0
15	LocalPort	UInt	2000
16	ActivateSecureConn	Bool	true
17	TLSServerReqClientCert	Bool	true
18	ExtTLSCapabilities	Word	16#0
19	TLSServerCertRef	UDInt	9
20	TLSClientCertRef	UDInt	3

NOTE

The “TLSServerCertRef” field must contain the ID, specified within the global certificate manager, of the server’s certificate.

The “TLSClientCertRef” is configured with the root certificate (ID = 3), as this CA will issue the client’s certificate. If the server trusts the CA, it automatically extends that trust to the client.

3. Add a second data block to store the incoming information sent by the client. Configure the data block to operate without "Optimized block access" and include the variables that are intended for transfer during communication.





4. Include the "Server IP_V4_ConnectionSEC" variable into the “CONNECT” field of the function block and drag-and-drop the "Received_Data" DB to the “DATA” field.

   To indicate when the server is ready to receive data, add a new tag to the “EN_R” field. Set the “CONT” field to true to maintain the connection alive.



2.6.3 Setting up the TLS client

Commissioning of a new device

As previously mentioned, the TLS client will be running on a second CPU. Therefore, add a new CPU to the project and commission it:

1. Navigate to the “Network view” and assign new IP Addresses to the second CPU.



2. Activate the global security settings in the device following the steps covered in section 2.3.3. Renew the secure PG-HMI communication certificate if it was deleted during this step.
3. Set up a new user and role with the necessary “Access Level” rights to access the CPU.

Creation of the client’s certificate

To set up the TLS client, create a new TLS client/server certificate:

1. Select the CPU in the project tree and navigate to the “Properties” tab.



2. Navigate to the entry “Protection and Security > Certificate Manager > Certificate management within TIA Portal” and create a new certificate in the “Device certificate” section.

3. Select the usage “TLS Client/Server” and choose Certification Authority with ID 3 to issue the certificate. The Subject Alternative Names (SANs) are automatically generated.



Program the OUC communication block

1. Open the folder “Communication > Open user communication” and drag-and-drop the “TSEND_C” function block to the main program.



This function block requires three main input parameters:

- REQ: trigger to send the data.
- CONNECT: variable with all necessary connection parameters.
- DATA: variables that will be sent by the client.

2. To set up the variable with the necessary connection parameters, create a new data block in the project and add a “TCON_IP_V4_SEC” variable. Set up this variable as shown in the image below.

Client_Connection_Parameters

	Name	Data type	Start value
1	Static		
2	Client IP_V4_Connection_SEC	TCON_IP_V4_SEC	
3	ConnPara	TCON_IP_v4	
4	InterfaceId	HW_ANY	64
5	ID	CONN_OUC	1
6	ConnectionType	Byte	11
7	ActiveEstablished	Bool	true
8	RemoteAddress	IP_V4	
9	ADDR	Array[1..4] of Byte	
10	ADDR[1]	Byte	192
11	ADDR[2]	Byte	168
12	ADDR[3]	Byte	0
13	ADDR[4]	Byte	1
14	RemotePort	UInt	2000
15	LocalPort	UInt	0
16	ActivateSecureConn	Bool	true
17	TLSServerReqClientCert	Bool	false
18	ExtTLSCapabilities	Word	16#0
19	TLSServerCertRef	UDInt	3
20	TLSClientCertRef	UDInt	11

3. Add a second data block to store the information that is going to be sent by the client. Configure the data block to operate without "Optimized block access" and include the variables that are intended for transfer during communication.

Send_Data

	Name	Data type	Offset	Start value
1	Static			
2	Var1	Bool	...	false
3	Var2	String	...	''

4. Include the "Client IP_V4_ConnectionSEC" variable into the “CONNECT” field of the function block and drag-and-drop the "Send_Data" DB to the “DATA” field. To trigger the send data instruction, add a new tag to the “REQ” field. Set the “CONT” field to true to maintain the connection alive.



2.6.4 Testing a Secure OUC communication

Once both devices are configured and running, the Secure Open User Communication can be tested. To establish the connection between server and client:

1. Activate “Enable receive” to allow data reception on the server’s side. Confirm that the status of the output field "BUSY" is true.



2. Apply changes to the variables that the client is set to transmit. As depicted bellow, there are different values in the respective data blocks of client and server.

Send_Data

	Name	Data type	Offset	Start value	Monitor value
1	Static				
2	Var1	Bool	0.0	false	TRUE
3	Var2	String	2.0	''	'Hello World!'

Received_Data

	Name	Data type	Offset	Start value	Monitor value
1	Static				
2	Var1	Bool	0.0	false	FALSE
3	Var2	String	2.0	''	''

3. Activate the client’s trigger to transmit the data.



4. Verify that the new updated values are received in the "Received_Data" DB.

Send_Data

	Name	Data type	Offset	Start value	Monitor value
1	Static				
2	Var1	Bool	0.0	false	TRUE
3	Var2	String	2.0	''	'Hello World!'

Received_Data

	Name	Data type	Offset	Start value	Monitor value
1	Static				
2	Var1	Bool	0.0	false	TRUE
3	Var2	String	2.0	''	'Hello World!'

Secure OUC vs Unsecured OUC

To understand the importance of encrypting and signing data, Wireshark is used to analyze the communication packages sent during transmission.

When data is transmitted via secure communication, it is encrypted and safeguarded with TLS v1.3. This ensures confidentiality of sensitive data, maintains its integrity, and authenticates the sender.



On the other hand, unsecure OUC transmits data in plain text, leaving sensitive information vulnerable to easy access and manipulation by attackers.



3 Additional information – Certificate management via OPC UA

3.1 GDS Push for dynamic certificate management

3.1.1 Overview

Supported TIA Portal and firmware versions

With TIA Portal V17 and firmware version V2.9, the GDS Push functionality has been integrated into the SIMATIC S7-1500 controller for OPC UA server certificates. Additionally, as of TIA Portal version V18 and firmware version V3.0, GDS push management for web server certificates is also supported.

Description

GDS Push utilizes the certificate management services of an OPC UA server to transfer web and OPC UA server certificates during runtime, as well as trust lists and certificate revocation lists for the latter.

After the CPU has been provisioned, certificates can be managed without TIA Portal, offering enhanced flexibility and convenience for long-term maintenance. This dynamic certificate management approach eliminates any manual work required for reconfiguring the CPU, i.e. after the period of validity of a certificate has expired. Moreover, GDS Push can transfer certificates and lists with the CPU in STOP and RUN mode, enabling operators to handle certificates with minimal disruptions to production.

Certificate management from the CPU's point of view

The use of dynamic certificate handling on the CPU is divided into three phases:

1. CPU configuration in TIA Portal and downloading of the configuration to the CPU.
2. Initial provisioning of a trust list and a server certificate.
3. Regular updating of certificates according to the security policies of a company.



Refer to the application example titled "Dynamic certificate management with OPC UA GDS Push" for detailed instructions on how to commission a CPU with GDS Push (https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/109799888).

3.1.2 GDS Push certificate handling scenarios

Scenario 1 - OPC UA certificates

Certificates need to be managed dynamically with GDS Push while controllers are in running mode. Both the certificate and private key of the server are generated using a central certificate management.



Scenario 2 - OPC UA certificates

Certificates need to be managed dynamically with GDS Push while controllers are in running mode. To enhance security and stick to safety recommendations, it has been decided to use a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to guarantee that the private key of the controller never leaves the CPU.



Scenario 3 - Web server certificates

Certificates need to be managed dynamically with GDS Push while controllers are in running mode.





4 FAQ / Error Handling

4.1 Certificates

4.1.1 Is it possible to work with certificates without protecting the project?

The only available method to work with certificates in TIA Portal, without protecting the project, is by using the local certificate manager with the global security settings disabled. Nonetheless, this approach offers limited functionality and restricts certificates to being self-signed.

4.1.2 How long should a certificate be valid?

In OT environments, the recommended certificate validity is regulated by the specific needs and security practices of the organization. There are, however, some general guidelines highlighted in chapter 1.4.

4.1.3 Which changes on the device configuration will require a new certificate?

Any information of the device configuration that has been included in the certificate, such as IP addresses, will require a certificate renewal.

Certificates generated through the local certificate manager are automatically updated, when relevant configuration changes are applied, once the project is compiled. However, certificates created via the global certificate manager do not undergo automatic updates, requiring users to “Renew” them manually.

4.1.4 Which SAN fields are mandatory?

Different communication protocols may impose mandatory fields within the SAN. The table below provides a summary of the required fields for each use case.

Table 4-1

	OPC UA server and client	TLS server *
URI	Mandatory	-
IP	Optional (Mandatory with FW 2.5)	Mandatory
DNS	Optional	Optional
RID	-	-
Email	-	-
Other Name	-	-

* HTTPS, Secure OUC and PG/HMI communication.

4.1.5 What is the difference between exporting the certificate chain vs certificate?

Exporting the certificate chain involves the export of not just the certificate itself but also of all intermediary and root authorities above it. This results in an export of all public keys from the trust hierarchy, which can be interesting in certain scenarios, such as debugging and troubleshooting.

Check Table 2-3 to determine which file formats support the export of certificate chains.

4.1.6 What happens if an incomplete chain of trust is loaded into the PLC’s “trusted certificate store”?

If an OPC UA client, such as UaExpert, possesses a certificate issued by an intermediate authority, which, in turn, was issued by a root CA, the server must have access to the entire trust chain in its "trusted certificate store".

If an incomplete chain of trust is loaded into the PLC's "trusted certificate store", the connection with the server will not be established.

NOTE

Usually, when trusting a higher certificate—be it the root or intermediate CA—automatic trust is extended to all certificates below the one that has been trusted. However, this principle is not applied in the local certificate manager of SIMATIC CPUs.

4.1.7 Which tools can be used to create certificates without TIA Portal?

Some useful tools to create certificates are:

- OpenSSL: is an open-source software used for general-purpose cryptography and to secure communications. To configure the necessary extensions needed for OPC UA and TLS communication, configuration files can be used to summarize all certificate requitements.

  The main drawback of OpenSSL is its reliance on command-line execution, resulting in a steep learning curve that can pose challenges for new users.
- XCA: built on top of OpenSSL, XCA incorporates a graphical interface that offers a user-friendly and intuitive experience for working with certificates. It is designed to handle various tasks, including creating, managing, and renewing X-509 certificates, securely storing private keys, generating revocation lists, processing certificate sign requests and more.

4.1.8 How can certificates be managed without downloading via TIA Portal?

As mentioned in section 3.1.1, GDS Push makes use of the certificate management services of an OPC UA server to transfer certificates during runtime. Additionally, trust lists and certificate revocation lists can also be updated dynamically.

A notable advantage of GDS Push is that, after provisioning the CPU, certificates can be managed without TIA Portal, offering enhanced flexibility and convenience for long-term maintenance.

4.2 OPC UA

4.2.1 Are certificates required to authenticate via username and password?

When a client session is authenticated via username and password, encryption of the password is essential to protect it from being stolen. Nonetheless, only the server's certificate is required, as the client uses the server's public key to encrypt the password.

Therefore, a client without public key (certificate) and private key can connect to an endpoint, with SecurityMode "None", employing username and password authentication.

NOTE

Regardless of the SecurityMode and authentication method used, the OPC UA server always sends its certificate to the client before starting the SecureChannel.

4.2.2 What happens to the OPC UA connection if one certificate expires?

If the OPC UA connection has already been established, the communication between client and server is maintained until the SecureChannel is renewed.

4.2.3 What is the SecureChannel and how often is it renewed?

Before initiating a session, OPC UA communication partners are required to establish a SecureChannel using the Private Key Infrastructure for asymmetric signing and encryption. The SecureChannel is then used to transfer the symmetric key between client and server without the risk of it being intercepted.

To initiate a SecureChannel, the OPC UA client sends a request to the server, specifying the desired Lifetime for the SecureChannel. The server then processes this request and responds to the client by generating a SecurityToken with a designated RevisedLifetime.



OPC UA clients are configured to reopen the SecureChannel when 75% of the SecurityToken Lifetime has elapsed, ensuring that they will receive a new SecurityToken before the previous one expires.

- The minimum lifetime of a SecureChannel in a SIMATIC controller is 300.000 milliseconds, 5 minutes, while the maximum lifetime is set to 3.600.000 milliseconds, 1 hour. Therefore, OPC UA servers running on SIMATIC controllers have a maximum SecurityToken Lifetime of 60 minutes. Due to the 75% rule, clients renew the SecureChannel every 45 minutes.
- Other OPC UA servers have a configuration file where these minimum and maximum values can be modified. SIMATIC controllers don't have an accessible configuration file that users can modify.

```
<TransportQuotas>
   <OperationTimeout>600000</OperationTimeout>
   <MaxStringLength>1048576</MaxStringLength>
   <MaxByteStringLength>1048576</MaxByteStringLength>
   <MaxArrayLength>65535</MaxArrayLength>
   <MaxMessageSize>4194304</MaxMessageSize>
   <MaxBufferSize>65535</MaxBufferSize>
   <ChannelLifetime>300000</ChannelLifetime>
   <SecurityTokenLifetime>3600000</SecurityTokenLifetime>
</TransportQuotas>
```

4.2.4 Why is it important to renew the SecureChannel?

Renewing the SecureChannel is important for two main reasons:

1. Attackers can decipher keys by analyzing encrypted messages. The more messages sent using the same key, the easier it becomes to perform "cryptanalytic attacks". Therefore, symmetric keys used in OPC UA communication should periodically be renewed to avoid this threat.
2. If a server/client certificate expires or its private key gets compromised, it is important to terminate ongoing communications. Applications are only able to verify their partners' certificates during the process of opening or renewing the SecureChannel. Therefore, without a predefined expiration mechanism for the SecurityToken, clients and servers would not know if their partner's certificate has expired or if it has been revoked.

NOTE

The OPC Foundation recommends shorter SecurityToken lifetimes for applications where the number of exchanged messages is expected to be high. This parameter can easily be modified in certain OPC UA client's like UaExpert.



4.2.5 What limitations exist for GDS Push?

For the OPC UA Push function, an S7-1500 CPU, regardless of the type, has a configuration limit of 62 trust list entries as of firmware version V2.9.

- Each activated certificate-based service, web server and OPC UA server, "consumes" one entry for the certificate and an entry for the private key.
- A Certificate Revocation List (CRL) counts as one entry in the list of trusted certificates.
- A certificate that is used by different services counts as a single trust list entry.

Additionally, the push function has a maximum size limit for elements, such as certificates, of 4096 bytes.

To gain deeper understanding of GDS Push, refer to chapter 11.2.7 of the Manual titled "SIMATIC S7-1500, ET 200MP, ET 200SP, ET 200AL, ET 200pro, ET 200eco PN Communication" (https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/59192925).

5 Appendix

5.1 Service and support

SiePortal

The integrated platform for product selection, purchasing and support - and connection of Industry Mall and Online support. The SiePortal home page replaces the previous home pages of the Industry Mall and the Online Support Portal (SIOS) and combines them.

- Products & Services
  In Products & Services, you can find all our offerings as previously available in Mall Catalog.
- Support
  In Support, you can find all information helpful for resolving technical issues with our products.
- mySieportal
  mySiePortal collects all your personal data and processes, from your account to current orders, service requests and more. You can only see the full range of functions here after you have logged in.

You can access SiePortal via this address: sieportal.siemens.com

Technical Support

The Technical Support of Siemens Industry provides you fast and competent support regarding all technical queries with numerous tailor-made offers – ranging from basic support to individual support contracts.
Please send queries to Technical Support via Web form:
support.industry.siemens.com/cs/my/src

SITRAIN – Digital Industry Academy

We support you with our globally available training courses for industry with practical experience, innovative learning methods and a concept that's tailored to the customer's specific needs.
For more information on our offered trainings and courses, as well as their locations and dates, refer to our web page:
siemens.com/sitrain

Industry Online Support app

You will receive optimum support wherever you are with the "Industry Online Support" app. The app is available for iOS and Android:

5.2 Links and literature

No.	Topic
\1\	Siemens Industry Online Support https://support.industry.siemens.com
\2\	Link to this entry page of this application example https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109769068
\3\	

5.3 Change documentation

Version	Date	Modification
V1.0	09/2019	First version
V2.0	03/2024	Complete rework