Alarm Management

SIEMENS

White Paper

The risks in process plants can not only be controlled reliably but also minimized with an efficient Alarm Management which is integrated in the process control system.
In effect, operations will be both more safely and more economically.

October 2008

While checking the alarm systems of crude oil extraction and production facilities along the Norwegian continental shelf, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate found substantial inadequacies in certain areas. As a consequence, the authority issued a corresponding body of rules for the design of alarm systems in the branch, which has decisively contributed towards establishing higher standards: The operators of oil and gas platforms in Norway are front runners with regard to plant safety. The Oseberg Field Center, an oil and gas extraction platform about 130 kilometers northwest of Bergen, also uses a highly effective alarm management system. At the suggestion of the specialists of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, the operator StatoilHydro implemented an exemplary alarm management system in order to improve the handling of alarms and thus minimize risks.

Reliable risk management is relevant not only in the oil and gas industry, but generally in process plants in all industries. An efficient alarm management system makes a decisive contribution in this respect and also presents economic advantages.

Content

Introduction

What is the purpose of alarm management?

Alarming states, in the truest sense of the word, often prevail in process plants with regard to alarm management. An after-effect of state-of-the-art instrumentation and control is the high alarm rates: Software-based alarms are much simpler and inexpensive to configure than hard-wired signals. The significantly lower effort required for alarm implementation and the high degree of communication of modern field devices, which themselves include a number of alarms, have resulted in a leap in the number of messages with which operators are confronted day-by-day. Due to the poor prioritization and conceptual design, the operators drown in downright "floods of alarms": Process status displays are listed as alarms, alarms are signaled that do not actually require any intervention by the operator, false alarms occur regularly, the displays in the control room are confusing and non-uniform, concepts and terms inconsistent. This situation overtaxes the operators and all too often result in unplanned and unnecessary plant shutdowns. The economic damage resulting for plant owners is estimated to amount to US$ 20 billion, according to a study.[1]

However, the economic loss is only one aspect. The range of possible consequences of a poor alarm management system range from damage to plants and loss in product quality, through danger to humans and the environment, down to the resulting image loss for the respective company.

The excessive demands placed on the operating personnel and their desensitizing effect due to the high basic load of alarms can be avoided: Efficient alarm management systems create the required scope for monitoring and managing the system. They provide the operators only with the information required as a basis for actions and decisions, and ensure that the operators can do their actual work: Carrying out qualified interventions in the process when necessary.



Figure 1: Configured alarms per operator [2]

[1] Woll, Dave: „Collaborative Process Automation Drives Return on Assets“, ARC 2002.

[2] Hollifield, Bill & Habibi, Eddie: The Alarm Management Handbook. A comprehensive Guide, PAS 2006.

Standards and recommendations

The dreadful conditions in the control rooms caused diverse organizations and committees to issue instructions and bodies of rules for the conception, application and maintenance of alarm management systems years ago. There are thus a number of standards of various origins existing parallel to each other that, depending of the background of the publishers, focus on different aspects.

These publications do not necessarily have a binding character for plant operators, but in many cases the publications are connected with corresponding specifications for the system manufacturers. They form the basis for technical developments in the field of alarm management. Current control system and technical possibilities allow the operators of process engineering systems to improve the quality of the alarm systems notably – and thus not only observe statutory requirements, but also profit with regard to safety and cost effectiveness from their implementation.

EEMUA 191
Alarm Systems. A Guide to Design, Management and Procurement.
The guideline published in 1999 in the United Kingdom by the Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA) provides practice-oriented recommendations for alarm management based on the experience of numerous end users and human factor studies. The basic idea is to keep the alarm occurrence at a level that is reasonable for the operator.

NAMUR NA 102 worksheet
Alarm Management
The worksheet with focus of the chemical industry in Central Europe was published in 2003 and supplemented in 2005 by the chapter "Alarm Management Engineering". NA 102 approaches the topic from two angles: On the one hand as instructions for the conceptual design, application and maintenance of alarm management systems that are intended for the planners and operators of process-engineering plants. However, NA 102 also functions as a specification. Manufacturers and suppliers of process control systems are called on to make the required functions available.

NPD YA 711
Principles for alarm system design
The body of rules of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate on the principles for designing alarm systems from 2001 laid the foundation for alarm systems in particular for the oil and gas industry.

VDI/VDE Guideline 3699
Process control using monitors
The VDI/VDE Guideline 3699 of the VDI/"VDE-Gesellschaft Mess- und Automatisierungstechnik" of 1998 deals with the configuration of graphical representations for process control, in particular for applications in the chemical and petrochemical process engineering. In addition to clear definition of concepts and terms, it represents a basis for process control using monitors. In addition to the principles of the configuration and organization of operator stations, the representation technique as well as aspects of the operability are addressed.

Being prepared: ISA S18.02
Management of Alarm Systems for the Process Industries
This standard that is currently being developed will describe the alarm management system for control systems in detail. It is based on the existing recommendations and takes the current technical possibilities into consideration.

Systematic alarm management

Improved handling of alarms

An essential first step in the systematic management of alarms is their complete documentation and statistical evaluation by means of corresponding databases and analysis tools. The analysis of alarm messages allows the development of strategies for reducing the alarm frequency and operator interventions and for exposing weak points and potential improvements in the plant.
However, progressive alarm management goes far beyond a statistical evaluation:
It helps the operator to differentiate between what is important and what is not important, provides clearly comprehensible alarm messages including information about the required measures as well as the option to comment the message and to store it. In addition it should be possible to suppress alarms from field devices or from specific process sections that are not important. Superfluous alarms or scenarios that require additional training measures can be determined by analyzing the performance key data of the alarm system.

	Alarms / Day	Average
effective processable	150	1 alarm / 10 minutes
barely manageable	300	1 alarm / 5 minutes
reality	>1400	~1 alarm / minute

Figure 2: Number of alarms determined on average[3]

Focusing on the essentials

When dealing with the management of alarms, one first has to define what an alarm actually is: "A message about a deviation of the process from the desired state that requires an immediate response from the operator "[4].

This definition already suggests the converse argument that messages that do not require a response by the operator should not be displayed as an alarm for the operator.
In view of the high alarm rate with which the operator is confronted day-by-day – up to 2,000 messages a day are not unheard of in the control room – it is paramount that the number of messages be reduced to a maintainable level. Users should observe the established recommendations with regard to the number of alarms and priorities: In accordance with the directives EEMUA 191 and NA 102 one alarm within ten minutes per operator would be the ideal state. An efficient alarm management system is indispensable in order to approach this ideal.



Figure 3: How many alarms can an operator theoretically respond to?

[3] EEMUA

[4] Definition of "alarm" in NAMUR-Worksheet NA 102 Alarm Management, 2003.

Alarm Management Lifecycle

The optimal alarm management system already begins in the planning phase and accompanies the plant operation as a continuous improvement process: Since the plants constantly change, the alarm management system has to be checked regularly and modified if necessary.

In reality the alarm management system also has a life cycle for the conception, application and maintenance of the corresponding systems that essentially consists of four phases.

1. Planning and conception: The right alarm philosophy

Careful planning is also indispensable in alarm management: Ideally, the process operator should already develop an alarm philosophy in the planning phase of the plant for the entire plant or even the whole company. This philosophy should be a concept taking into consideration his (branch-) specific requirements that is then implemented and observed consistently.

2. Alarm-Engineering

Economical alarm engineering is primarily control system engineering: The current control system provides a number of required tools and technical possibilities for configuring the alarms that help the plant operators to implement the philosophy. Since alarm philosophies are conceivably different, depending on the branch, location or country, a high degree of flexibility is required at this point from the DCS manufacturer.

3. Plant operation

During ongoing operation, the corresponding alarms have to be displayed to the operator in a structured form and prioritized. A clear separation of control-system and process alarms is of decisive importance since they address users responsible for different functions. Messages that come from field devices belong to the control system messages. They are typically directed to the maintenance personnel and it should be possible to visualize them on a maintenance station separated from the process. The operating personnel, on the other hand, only receive the events coming from the process, classified into message classes, on the operator station.

Every alarm should include instructions for the operator. This is realized ideally by the assignment of corresponding help texts in the control system.

4. Analysis

While the plant is operating, superordinate analysis tools or integrated tools have to be used to regularly check what form the alarm occurrence takes: Are there peaks or alarms that occur more often or are active for a particularly long amount of time? Are the recommendations and standards observed? The analysis makes it clear where there are problems in the system in spite of the alarm philosophy. It provides the basis for eliminating these problems either through the engineering or by replacing hardware, for example by replacing certain modules that are not able to avoid flicker alarms through filtering.

Two examples are used below to show how concrete problem areas from the industrial sector can be mastered or avoided completely by means of good alarm management.

Figure 4: Principle of the alarm management life cycle as envisioned by the ISA



Typical application examples

1. The alarm avalanche

Starting up and shutting down system components for maintenance or the activation of an emergency-off switch with which a complete unit is switched off often results in an alarm avalanche, i.e. a flood of subsequent alarms that can run into the thousands. However, particularly in these types of situations that are often critical, it is often not possible or necessary to react to every alarm, but only to the most urgent and important ones.

Being able to control the plant takes absolute precedence. This means that the system may not be overburdened during the alarm avalanche and it must remain possible for the operator to operate it. The reported alarms must furthermore always remain traceable, including chronological history and time stamp for every single alarm (so-called "sequence of events"). This can be realized, for example, with a time synchronization for all the components.

The most efficient approach is naturally to always avoid alarm avalanches. It is sufficient when the causal alarm is displayed, direct subsequent alarms are not as important for the operator. The course of action can be set in the engineering process: After an emergency-off, all the subsequent alarms are prevented by the corresponding programming in the automation system. This programmed solution involves disadvantages and risks, since the specified alarms are really no longer issued and are therefore no longer available for evaluation later.

Figure 5: Assignment of the technological functions to alarm groups.



	Hierarchy	Chart	Block group	With interrupt	Family	Author	Block type	Internal ID	Process tag type
1	PlantA\	Auto	Alarmgruppe 1	☐	OPERATE	BASIS70	OP_D	FB48	
2	PlantA\Tank1\	Tank1		☐	MULTIPLX	CFC_BOP	SEL_R		
3	PlantA\Tank1\	Tank1		☐	MULTIPLX	CFC_BOP	SEL_R		
4	PlantA\Tank1\	Tank1		☐	MATH_FP	ELEMENTA	ADD_R	FC61	
5	PlantA\Tank1\	Tank1		☐	MATH_FP	ELEMENTA	ADD_R	FC61	
6	PlantA\Tank1\	Tank1		☐	COMPARE	ELEMENTA	CMP_R	FC60	
7	PlantA\Tank1\	Tank1		☐	FLIPFLOP	CFC_BOP	RS_FF		
8	PlantA\Tank1\	Tank1		☐	FLIPFLOP	CFC_BOP	RS_FF		
9	PlantA\Tank1\	Tank1		☐	FLIPFLOP	CFC_BOP	RS_FF		
10	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	LT111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_AI	FC275	ANAMON
11	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	LT111	Alarmgruppe 2	☑	CONTROL	TECHN70	MEAS_MON	FB65	ANAMON
12	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	PT111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_AI	FC275	ANAMON
13	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	PT111	Alarmgruppe 1	☑	CONTROL	TECHN70	MEAS_MON	FB65	ANAMON
14	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	TT112		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_AI	FC275	ANAMON
15	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	TT112	Alarmgruppe 3	☑	CONTROL	TECHN70	MEAS_MON	FB65	ANAMON
16	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	FT111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_AI	FC275	ANAMON
17	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	FT111	Alarmgruppe 1	☑	CONTROL	TECHN70	MEAS_MON	FB65	ANAMON
18	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	WT111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_AI	FC275	ANAMON
19	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	WT111	Alarmgruppe 2	☑	CONTROL	TECHN70	MEAS_MON	FB65	ANAMON
20	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	PT112		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_AI	FC275	ANAMON
21	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	PT112	Alarmgruppe 1	☑	CONTROL	TECHN70	MEAS_MON	FB65	ANAMON
22	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	TT111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_AI	FC275	ANAMON
23	PlantA\Tank1\Analog\	TT111	Alarmgruppe 1	☑	CONTROL	TECHN70	MEAS_MON	FB65	ANAMON
24	PlantA\Tank1\Digital\	LS111	Alarmgruppe 1	☑	CONTROL	TECHN70	DIG_MON	FB62	DIGMON
25	PlantA\Tank1\Digital\	LS111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_DI	FC277	DIGMON
26	PlantA\Tank1\Digital\	PB111	Alarmgruppe 2	☐	OPERATE	BASIS70	OP_D	FB48	PUSHBUTTON
27	PlantA\Tank1\Digital\	PB111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_DO	FC278	PUSHBUTTON
28	PlantA\Tank1\Motors\	AG111		☐	BIT_LGC	CFC_BOP	OR		MOTOR
29	PlantA\Tank1\Motors\	AG111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_DI	FC277	MOTOR
30	PlantA\Tank1\Motors\	AG111	Alarmgruppe 1	☑	CONTROL	TECHN70	MOTOR	FB66	MOTOR
31	PlantA\Tank1\Motors\	AG111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_DO	FC278	MOTOR
32	PlantA\Tank1\Motors\	AG111		☐	BIT_LGC	CFC_BOP	AND		MOTOR
33	PlantA\Tank1\PID\	PIL111		☐	BIT_LGC	CFC_BOP	OR		PIDCTRL
34	PlantA\Tank1\PID\	PIL111	Alarmgruppe 3	☐	CONTROL	BASIS70	PT1_P	FB51	PIDCTRL
35	PlantA\Tank1\PID\	PIL111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_AI	FC275	PIDCTRL
36	PlantA\Tank1\PID\	PIL111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_AO	FC276	PIDCTRL
37	PlantA\Tank1\PID\	PIL111	Alarmgruppe 1	☑	CONTROL	TECHN70	CTRL_PID	FB61	PIDCTRL
38	PlantA\Tank1\PID\	PIL111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_AI	FC275	PIDCTRL
39	PlantA\Tank1\PID\	PIL111		☐	MULTIPLX	CFC_BOP	SEL_R		PIDCTRL
40	PlantA\Tank1\Valves\	V111		☐	BIT_LGC	CFC_BOP	OR		VALVE
41	PlantA\Tank1\Valves\	V111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_DI	FC277	VALVE
42	PlantA\Tank1\Valves\	V111		☐	DRIVER	DRIVER70	CH_DO	FC278	VALVE
43	PlantA\Tank1\Valves\	V111		☐	BIT_LGC	CFC_BOP	AND		VALVE
44	PlantA\Tank1\Valves\	V111	Alarmgruppe 1	☑	CONTROL	TECHN70	VALVE	FB73	VALVE
45	PlantA\Tank1\Valves\	V112		☐	BIT_LGC	CFC_BOP	OR		VALVE

A remedy for the operator is to use so-called alarm hiding, meaning that the alarms are hidden. The alarm avalanche is mitigated by intelligent mechanisms in the system. The Siemens Simatic PCS 7 process control system, for example, provides the possibility, in the form of the *Smart Alarm Hiding* tool, of hiding those alarms that are caused as a subsequent alarm of another alarm in the operator view. However, all the alarms are included chronologically in the archive, meaning that they remain traceable and that a substantiated analysis can be carried out later. The hidden alarms are listed in the so-called *Hidden List* that the operator can call up and view at any time. The hidden alarms are designated as such here.

The Alarm Hiding is implemented in accordance with the plant philosophy. As a first step the causal relationships have to be configured. Engineering of the Alarm Hiding is in principle extensive. The task of the control system is to reduce this work as far as possible.

With Simatic PCS 7, the filter for hiding alarms can be defined in the process object view. To this purpose operating states are defined for the plant or system components (for example the operating state "Emergency-off", but also "Startup", "Normal operation", "Maintenance", etc.). In order to avoid having to program every single logic function to the full scope in the engineering process, the plant is reduced to typical operating states and then a matrix is used (for example as an MS Excel® spreadsheet) to specify which alarms are to be hidden at which operating states. If, for example, maintenance is carried out on a subsystem later, all the non-relevant messages arising during maintenance from this subsystem are not visible for the operator and also do not emit an acoustical signal. The matrix can then simply be reimported back into the control system. The work, costs and also error sources are thus reduced considerably and Alarm Hiding can also be configured without any knowledge of DCS engineering.



Figure 6: Definition of the hiding rules in a matrix

2. The flicker alarm

The cause of constantly recurring alarms, so-called flicker alarms, often lies in faulty sensors, in additional to poorly set measuring circuits. For example, a defective transmitter in a module triggers a flicker alarm at the level monitoring of a vessel. This flicker alarm is normally addressed not to the operator, but rather to the service personnel of the plant. The operator only needs the information that the level indication of the vessel is incorrect.

If the flicker alarm is nevertheless reported in the control room, it can cause important process-specific alarms to be obscured. In the worst case the operator may miss critical process signals so that the risk of an unforeseen incident increases. Several procedures for alarm suppression are available here. In the case of binary values this can implemented process-controlled by means of a delay directly in the module. Although the alarm is still monitored in the module, it is only emitted once. In the case of analog measured values, hysteresis functions in the module or in the corresponding technological function block in the library can be used.

In addition, countermeasures can be initiated by using the operator control and monitoring system in the control room. The control system must give the operator the possibility to select a recognized flicker alarm in the alarm list and to hide it manually. With the Siemens Simatic PCS 7 process control system, the operator can use the *Manual Hiding* feature to ensure that the alarm is no longer displayed, but nevertheless archived. In the case of manually hidden alarms it should furthermore be possible to display the alarms again automatically after a selectable interval in order to ensure that hidden alarms are not forgotten.

Always ensure traceability

In the case of alarm avalanches, flicker alarms or, at worst, accidents, all the alarms have to be logged chronologically in the archive and must be traceable. None of the operator operations / actions may be missing in the log. Only on the basis of this complete data basis is it possible to regularly draw up corresponding statistics and to check whether the alarm philosophy still holds true. All the data are also available for future analysis after an unforeseen incident.

It must be possible to filter the data to this purpose, for example by period, operator interventions, etc. Here, an analysis tool should be able to point out abnormal situations by itself. The findings from the analysis then ideally flow back into the engineering process. To this purpose the tools have to meet the following minimum requirements:

- Recognize the frequency of alarms
- Offer the possibility of filtering the alarms by the plant sections
- Record the alarm duration and priority



...	Event	Source	Priority	Frequency	average dT C / G	average dT C / acknowledge	rage dT C / sec
1	Cause Active : Safety Matrix für die Projekte	AnlageSFC/@AnlageSFC/AnlageSFC	1	197	27.792	33.066	33.06
2	High Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Komm_AS20u21/v	0	177	6.000	34.475	34.47
3	High Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Komm_AS13/vonA	0	176	6.000	34.938	34.93
4	High Alarm	Klärwerk/Rechen/GROB/Verdeck_Map	0	148	7.000	40.405	40.40
5	High Alarm	Klärwerk/Rechen/GROB/Verd	0	148	7.000	40.473	40.47
6	High Alarm	Energie/Oel/Oelstand	0	147	7.000	40.755	40.75
7	High Alarm	Energie/Strom/Spannung	0	147	7.000	39.837	39.83
8	High Alarm	Energie/Biogas/Druck_Bio	0	147	7.000	39.857	39.85
9	High Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel3/S4_P8_K4	0	31	36.000	186.194	186.19
10	High Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel3/S4_P8_K3	0	31	36.839	172.100	172.10
11	High Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel3/S4_P8_K2	0	31	37.667	202.367	202.36
12	High Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel3/Hotfix0	0	30	38.433	196.161	196.16
13	High Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel3/S4_P8_K1	0	30	38.433	202.387	202.38
14	HighHigh Alarm	Energie/Strom/Spannung	0	18	3.000	360.235	360.23
15	HighHigh Alarm	Energie/Biogas/Druck_Bio	0	18	3.000	360.235	360.23
16	Low Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/20	0	18	69.778	327.889	327.88
17	LowLow Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/20	0	18	56.611	328.500	328.50
18	Low Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/19	0	18	87.889	335.556	335.55
19	LowLow Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/19	0	18	50.722	355.056	355.05
20	HighHigh Alarm	Klärwerk/Labor/S1_B7_K2	0	18	49.000	321.611	321.61
21	Low Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/18	0	18	72.294	320.833	320.83
22	LowLow Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/18	0	18	59.941	362.389	362.38
23	High Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/20	0	18	81.235	309.667	309.66
24	HighHigh Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/20	0	18	66.529	328.722	328.72
25	High Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/19	0	17	75.353	329.625	329.62
26	A8 zu tief	ATrend/AT2	0	17	190.706	346.588	346.58
27	High Alarm	Klärwerk/Filter/Sandfilter/18	0	17	67.353	349.529	349.52
28	HighHigh Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/19	0	17	50.588	352.750	352.75
29	High Alarm	Klärwerk/Filter/Sandfilter/19	0	17	66.059	357.235	357.23
30	High Alarm	Klärwerk/Filter/Sandfilter/20	0	17	65.000	372.353	372.35
31	High Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/18	0	17	74.471	360.647	360.64
32	A7 zu tief	ATrend/AT2	0	17	194.353	351.588	351.58
33	HighHigh Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/18	0	17	49.941	338.765	338.76
34	A8 zu hoch	ATrend/AT3	0	17	381.176	339.000	339.00
35	High Alarm	Kesselhaus/Kessel2/Kessel2/17	0	17	78.882	367.765	367.76

List: 232 Window: 172 Ack: 225 Attention: Source data amounts were limited to 10000 data records.

Figure 7: It must be possible to have sorted and displayed all the alarms on the basis of different aspects

Summary

In view of the increasing number of statutory requirements and with regard to the insurance aspects, plant operators nowadays can no longer avoid having to deal with the topic of alarm management systems. They should however also do it in their own interest: A carefully planned and optimally set alarm system provides a clear advantage for the cost effectiveness and safe and stable operation in production plants in all branches. A professional alarm management system contributes decisively towards increasing the process safety and the availability of a plant, ensuring the product quality and simultaneously reducing costs.

The ideal way to ensuring improved handling of alarms is the relief of the operator and his systematic guidance during ongoing operation. Strict avoidance of useless and unimportant alarms and already focusing on the important points while drawing up the alarm philosophy helps in avoiding excessive demands on and unsettling of the operators, and instead provides them with specific information about relevant deviations in the process or plant. The reduction in the alarm occurrence provides the operating personnel with more time and the necessary freedom to ensure reliable and safe process control. The support provided by a professional alarm management system to the instrumentation and control and its integration in the control system represent the optimal solution since this ensures that the load on the operator is not increased by an additional system.

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